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FEDERAL COURTS: 
ART. III(1), ART. I(8), ART. IV(3)(2), ART. II(2)/I(8)(3), 
AND ART. II(1) ADJUDICATION 
 
Laura K. Donohue, J.D., Ph.D. and Jeremy McCabe, J.D.* 
 
ABSTRACT. The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost 
unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts 
with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or 
“legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus, 
and most, but not all, federal courts are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach further 
ignores the full range of federal courts, which are rooted in different constitutional provisions: Art. III(1), 
Art. I(8); Art. IV(3); Art. II(2)/I(8)(3); and Art. II(1). These distinctions matter greatly in terms of defining 
jurisdiction and understanding the scope of the authorities—and constitutional protections—that apply. 
The failure of scholars to take into account the full panoply of the federal judicial system has contributed 
to inaccurate analyses and cabined the debate. This article takes a significant step forward, providing a 
conceptual, framework for each type of court and delineating, based on their legal and historical 
underpinning, which adjudicatory bodies in the history of the United States fall within each category. It 
details the constitutive elements of the courts and their jurisdiction as supported by doctrine, statutory law, 
and scholarly literature, providing the first, comprehensive taxonomy of federal courts in the United States. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout U.S. history, entities created under Article III(1) have been referred to as 
“constitutional courts.” What characterizes them is that they share “in the exercise of 
the judicial power defined in [Art. III(2)], can be invested with no other jurisdiction, 
and have judges who hold office during good behavior, with no power in Congress to 
provide otherwise.”1 In contrast, certain tribunals that do not meet the Article III 
requirements have been labelled “Article I,” “legislative”, or “non-constitutional” 
courts. These institutions are understood to be “created by Congress in the exertion of 
other powers,” with their functions directed to specific ends and their judges holding 
office according to conditions set by Congress.2 While they may have some statutory 
protections, adjudicators in Article I tribunals are not constitutionally protected from 
removal during periods of good behavior; nor is their compensation guaranteed to 
remain undiminished during their tenure.3  
 
The epithets employed to describe these two types of entities are deeply misleading. 
“Constitutional” (i.e., Article III) courts are not the only federal adjudicatory bodies 
constitutionally-grounded: every federal court finds its locus in the constitutional text. 
Nor are “legislative” (i.e., “Article I” courts) the only tribunals brought into being by 
legislation. All inferior Article III courts are created by Congress. Numerous other 
tribunals are rooted in Congress’s Article I(8) enumerated powers. Some courts 
established by Congress, moreover, do not derive from Article I(8) enumerated powers 
at all, instead finding their locus in Article IV(3). Yet other entities, such as courts of 
occupation, have nothing to do with Congress but, under Article II, are constitutional 
federal courts nonetheless.  
 
* Georgetown Law. Special thanks to Caitlin Chiaramonte, Kevin Jinks, Michel Paradis, Pete Pascucci, 
David Vladeck, and Brian Wolfman for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929). 
2 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (Van Devanter, J. Accord Williams v. United States, 289 
U.S. 553, 563 (1933). 
3 Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 449; Williams, 289 U.S. at 561, 581. 
   2 
 
The lack of precision has resulted in an inaccurate representation of what constitutes 
the federal judicial system. Casebooks and treatises largely ignore dozens of federal 
courts in existence.4 Even Hart and Wechsler, a canonical text, mentions just a handful 
of non-Article III entities and sidesteps any discussion of their constitutional 
underpinning.5 The lack of attention to the constituent parts of the system stunts our 
understanding of constitutional law, the history of the judiciary, the relationship among 
federal courts, and the extent—and limits—of their jurisdiction. It contributes to vague 
and inaccurate assertions.6 And it fuels the cumbrous and narrow debate about the 
legitimacy of assigning matters within the cases and controversies requirements of 
Article III to Article I entities.7 Scholars’ failure to consider the full range of federal 
 
4 See, e.g., MICHAEL FINCH ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2020) 
(incorporating only one chapter on non-Article III courts); MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 2019) (focusing almost entirely on Article III and the 
relationship between federal and state courts, with only cursory mention of legislative courts and 
administrative tribunals and no discussion of territorial courts, consular courts, military tribunals, or other 
non-Article III entities); ARTHUR D. HELLMAN ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS (4th ed. 2017) (defining “The Federal Judicial 
System” entirely in terms of Article III); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: THE CURRENT QUESTIONS 
(2017) (narrowly discussing Article III entities); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (6th ed. 
2012) (adopting as its purpose “to state clearly the current law defining the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts,” but then going on to focus solely on Article III); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND MARY KAY KANE, 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (7th ed. 2011) (addressing just Article III courts and their relationship to 
state courts); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (2d ed. 2011) (discussing only on 
Article III entities); ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (making only cursory 
reference in the introductory chapter to “legislative courts” as entities created under Article I and omitting 
any reference to territorial courts, consular courts, or courts of occupation); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL 
COURTS 100-02, 118-31 (3d ed. 2009) (only one out of twelve chapters addressing “Non-Article III 
Adjudicative Bodies” in which cursory reference is made to a few examples). 
5 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 36-39 (7th ed. 2018) (very briefly mentioning Courts of the District of Columbia, territorial 
courts, the tax court, the court of federal claims, the court of veterans appeals, and military tribunals). 
6 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (collapsing administrative 
tribunals and Article I(8) courts into the same category by suggesting that “legislative courts” often have 
“administrative and quasilegislative as well as judicial duties” and briefly mentioning in the same 
discussion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a specialized court created by Congress without 
acknowledging it as an Article III entity); William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 1511, 1522, 1549, 1558 (2020) (overlooking consular courts and courts of occupation, both of 
which exercise Article II power despite due process implications; referring to “so-called military courts” 
as “not really courts in the constitutional sense;” and asserting “[b]ankruptcy courts, military courts, the 
U.S. Tax Court, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are not courts, in the constitutional sense.”); David 
J. Bederman, Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825, 833-34 (1993) (overlooking the role of Article II 
in the formation of consular courts); DAVID YANCEY THOMAS, A HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 
NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES 317-18 (1904) (collapsing the extraterritorial court 
that operated in the Panama Canal Zone under an Article II/I hybrid model with Article I(8) military 
tribunals and referring to military commissions as “courts martial”). 
7 For further discussion of the debate see, e.g., Baude, supra note 6 (distinguishing among certain courts 
as exercising either the judicial or the executive power); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III 
Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (arguing for an 
inferior tribunal reading of Art. I(8)(9) to support the existence of both Article III and I entities); Craig A. 
Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV.1043, 1073-
74 (1998) (distinguishing between judicial and executive power to explain the Article III/Article I 
divide); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 
887-892 (1990) (challenging the legitimacy of territorial courts and referring to Marshall’s decision in 
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) as “fatuous”); Paul M. Bator, 
The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 
233, 235-36 (1990) (arguing the existence of non-Article III courts as a matter of history and expediency, 
not constitutional fidelity); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
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courts has led to inaccurate characterizations of what constitutes federal judicial power. 
While some entities may have recourse to Article III entities as an appellate matter (and 
thus carry “the judicial power of the United States”), not all of them do—nor need they, 
as a constitutional matter, in order to exercise a judicial power. 
 
This Article, accordingly, provides the first comprehensive account of the federal 
judicial system, which includes general and specialized Article III(1) courts; specialized 
Article I(8) enumerated powers courts; Article IV(3) territorial courts; Article 
II(2)/I(8)(3) treaty-based courts; and Article II(1) courts of occupation. It defines and 
distinguishes these from each other and from administrative tribunals, providing in the 
process a robust account of the scope of the judiciary and demonstrating that the system 
is far more complex than the simple binary approach that has hitherto marked scholarly 
discussion. In so doing, it challenges existing theoretical constructs that mark the field. 
 
Part II begins by detailing the eight Article III(1) courts that currently operate, five 
of which have specialized subject matter jurisdiction.8 It recognizes numerous 
specialized Article III courts that are no longer in existence and acknowledges that all 
Article III(1) courts have inherent powers that stem from their duty to ensure fairness 
and justice in the course of adjudication, their ability to efficiently manage their 
resources, and their interest in protecting the integrity, independence, and reputation of 
the courts as an institution.9 These powers do not depend on any statute. They arise from 
the courts qua Article III entities. In recognition of separation of powers, those that go 
to the core of the court acting in its judicial capacity are beyond the reach of either 
Congress or the Executive Branch. 
 
In Part III, we turn to specialized courts established under Congress’s Article I(8) 
enumerated powers. While much has been made of the relationship between Article 
I(8)(9), granting Congress the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, 
and Article III entities, almost no attention has been paid to the relationship of Article 
I(8)(9) to the other elements of Article I(8) which provide further constitutional 
grounding. Article I(8)(17) provides a locus for  Courts of the District of Columbia (the 
 
JUDICIAL POWER 36-39 (2d ed. 1990) (attacking territorial courts and arguing that military tribunals are 
best considered as part of Article III); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative 
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (1988) (embracing the appellate review theory); 
Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 
DUKE L. J. 197 (presenting criteria for Article III versus administrative agency adjudication); David P. 
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 48 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 646, 719 (1982) (critiquing Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Canter as to the legitimacy 
of a territorial court as “difficult to reconcile with the purposes of Article III” while sidestepping the 
potential locus of Congressional authority as Article IV). 
8 The five include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review; the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
and the U.S. Court of International Trade. 
9 For scholarly discussion of essential inherent powers, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common 
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008), Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts and 
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001), and Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory 
Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). To the extent that scholars disagree, it is in how broadly such powers 
should be understood. Some say any action bearing a natural relation to the administration of justice falls 
exclusively within the purview of the courts. See, e.g., Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent 
Powers of Federal Court, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 53 (2008); Linda Mullenix, Unconstitutional 
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1320-22 
(1993). 
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Superior Court and the Court of Appeals).10 In the military sphere, nine tribunals find 
their homes in Articles I(8)(10), (11), (14), and (16). They divide into three categories: 
the courts-martial system regulates servicemembers11; military commissions apply to 
civilians and enemy combatants12; and veterans courts adjudicate retired 
servicemembers’ benefits. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims and U.S. Tax Court both 
derive from Article I(8)(1), with the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts and Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panels as well as the (now defunct) citizenship courts from Article I(8)(4).13 Because 
Article III powers do not extend to Article I tribunals, litigants in the latter have access 
as of right to an Article III appellate court. 14 
 
Article I is not the only source of Congressional power to constitute judicial entities. 
Part IV, accordingly, turns to Article IV(3)(2), which provides for Congress “to dispose 
of an make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States.”15 This clause provides independent authority for 
adjudication of disputes outside of Article III—a power that has been conspicuously 
overlooked in the effort to shoehorn federal courts into the “Article III or Article I” 
nomenclature. Two categories mark this area: the first, incorporated territorial courts, 
operated in nearly every state (outside of the original thirteen colonies), prior to 
admission to the union; the second relates to unincorporated land, in which Congress 
has established a number of parallel courts. The three currently in existence feed into 
Article III(1).  
 
Part V turns to treaty-based courts, which derive from Article II(2) coupled with 
Congress’s commerce authority under Article I(8)(3). Unlike territorial courts, in regard 
to which Congress acts as the first mover, courts in this category depend on the 
Executive to negotiate international agreements, subsequent to which Congress acts 
first to ratify the treaty and then to implement its requirements. Consular courts come 
within this category, as do other entities established by Congress consistent with 
diplomatic agreements, which are not housed in the country with whom the agreement 
was reached. With a couple of exceptions (i.e., the U.S. Court of China and the Court 
of Private Land Claims, which dealt with title to lands transferred to the United States 
following the Mexican-American War), treaty-based courts have been insulated from 
Article III(1) adjudication. 
 
Part VI examines Article II courts of occupation and expansion, which the President 
establishes in the context of war in occupied territories. Far from being a relic of the 
past, at least four such courts operated in the twentieth century. None is supported by 
legislation. Instead, they rely wholly on the President’s Article II(1) powers. In some 
cases, these tribunals have acted as a forerunner to territorial courts established by 
Congress under Article IV(3)(2). The divide into three categories: courts established in 
 
10 The constitutional nexus for the Court is considered to be U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. But note that 
the District of Columbia courts’ statuses have alternated over history. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
11 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969), overruled  by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 
435, 436 (1987) (holding that trying a member of the Armed Forces under the UCMJ does not require the 
offense charged to have a service connection).  
12 See In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Khadr v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1316 
(C.M.C.R. 2014). 
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 8, 1, 4. 
14 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494-95 (2011). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
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land acquired by the United States, courts established in response to armed rebellion, 
and courts created in the context of war. 
 
In Part VII, we briefly address administrative tribunals, which depart from 
specialized Article I(8) courts by the degree of independence they have from the 
Executive. Numerous such entities provide appeals of executive agency decisions or 
themselves constitute independent, quasi-judicial agencies. Some examples include: the 
U.S. Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the Social Security 
Administration’s Appeal Council, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Election 
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board.  
 
The final section, Part VIII, underscores that the federal judicial structure is far 
more complex than is generally acknowledged. Accounts that narrowly focus on the 
interplay between Article III and Article I(8)(9) miss the independent power of 
Congress to establish adjudicatory bodies pursuant to its other authorities. Similarly 
absent are considerations about other constitutional authorities that give rise to different 
types of courts. Trying to justify the difference by according judicial power to territories 
as a separate government may seem attractive, but it fails to account for the impact on 
citizens’ rights. No more so does it explain treaty-based or consular courts, or even 
courts of occupation. What does account for these entities is the fact that they are rooted 
in different constitutional powers and part of an intricate system of adjudication. 
II.  THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: ARTICLE III(1) COURTS 
 
Article III(1) provides for the judicial Power to be vested in the Supreme Court “and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”16 
Under this power, the legislature has established both non-specialized and specialized 
Article III courts. Their status conveys certain inherent authorities that are 
constitutionally-derived and indelibly linked to the courts’ status as a co-equal branch 
of government. The fact that some of these courts are geographically-limited, or 
established with particular subject-matter in mind, does nothing to divest them of their 
Article III authority as the judicial power of the United States.  
 
Once created, Article III courts “share in the exercise of judicial power defined in 
[Article III].”17 All Article III judges are guaranteed life tenure, removal only for good 
cause, and undiminished compensation.18 Unlike most state courts, all Article III Courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction.19 They have authority over nine categories of cases 
and controversies, which divide into two general categories: the nature of the cause and 
the character of the parties.20 The “judicial power” exercised in relation to them is “the 
power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between 
persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.”21 Cabined by the 
constitutional tenets, the meaning assigned to “cases” and “controversies” therefore at 
once establishes federal jurisdiction and, along with the contours set by statute, 
 
16 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
17 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929). 
18 Id. 
19 See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799). 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821). 
21 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911). 
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determines the extent of the judicial power. The Supreme Court has, at times, read the 
clause broadly to encompass cases that turn on a “federal ingredient.”22  
 
A. Non-Specialized Geographic Courts 
 
Non-specialized Article III courts are the courts one generally thinks of when 
contemplating the “federal judiciary”: namely, the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, the District Courts, and the (now defunct) Circuit Courts.23 Although all 
federal courts have some level of specialization of subject matter, Congress granted 
these courts (save the Supreme Court) with jurisdiction based on geographic location.24  
 
The Supreme Court, subject to the case-or-controversy requirement, exercises 
absolute authority over the U.S. Constitution, treaties, and federal statutory law. It 
understands this requirement to mean that Article III courts may not issue advisory 
opinions and the matter in question must satisfy standing and ripeness, not be moot, and 
not present a “political question.”25 The Court also exercises jurisdiction over matters 
involving federal common law, with due deference to comity and respect for state 
authorities.26 Congress has assigned the Supreme Court original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more states and original (but not 
exclusive) jurisdiction of all actions in which ambassadors or public officials of foreign 
states are party, all controversies between the states and the federal government, and all 
actions by a state against citizens of another state or aliens.27 The Court has the authority 
to review (by certiorari) all cases in the Courts of Appeal as well as all federal questions 
decided via state courts of last resort.28 It has jurisdiction over decisions from the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals,29 the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico,30 and the supreme court of the Virgin Islands,31 as well as the specialized 
Article III courts and certain decisions of the [Article I(8)] U.S. Court of Appeals for 
 
22 See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824). Note, however, that to the extent 
that Osborn is good law, it is because it is considered an expression of protective jurisdiction—i.e., a 
reading of “arising under” to protect vital federal interest. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 
461 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1983). After Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, however, the “ingredient” argument 
has taken a back seat and the Court has in general taken a more restrained view of what constitutes a 
claim “arising under” federal law. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 
(1908). 
23 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75; Judiciary Act of 
1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826.  
24 See Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 9, 11-12, 1 Stat. at 76-77, 78-80 (district and circuit courts); Judiciary Act 
of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.  While it is recognized that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
has a different docket load than other regional circuits, we have included it within the non-specialized 
sets of courts. See, e.g., Eric M. Fraser et al. The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 131 (2013) (discussing the Court’s unique workload resulting from the Court’s location, its 
geographic coverage compared to other regional circuits, and Congress’s penchant for giving the Court 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in many different types of cases). 
25 See Letter from the Supreme Court Justices to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) 
(establishing no advisory opinions); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) 
(establishing political-question doctrine); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (acknowledging the 
Article III “prohibition against advisory opinions”). 
26 See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.  (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874) (refraining from reviewing 
state common law not as a matter of Constitutional jurisdiction but out of comity).  
27 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West). 
28 Id. §§ 1254(a), 1257. 
29 Id. § 1257(b). 
30 Id. § 1258. 
31 Id. § 1260. 
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the Armed Forces.32 Although originally established with one chief justice and five 
associate justices appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
under the Judiciary Act of 1869, the Court expanded to include its current number of 
one chief justice and eight associate justices.33  
 
The Courts of Appeal and District Courts serve as inferior, non-specialized and 
geographically-limited courts.34 The former is constituted by 179 judges appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the senate.35 Like those on the Supreme 
Court, they have life tenure and salary protection.36 They are divided into 12 regional 
circuits,37 which encapsulate 91 district courts.38 The 663 judges appointed to the 
District Courts have the same constitutional protections extended to the Supreme Court 
and the Courts of Appeal.39  
 
Two primary statutes establish subject matter jurisdiction for the District Courts, 
granting them original jurisdiction over federal questions (i.e., “all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”) as well as disputes 
between and among citizens of different states (i.e., diversity jurisdiction).40 Several 
provisions detail jurisdiction of constitutionally-enumerated federal questions,41 
provide additional bases for the suit authorized under Article III.42 Congress restricted 
the ability of Article III courts to act on certain matters until they have first worked their 
way through the state judicial domain.43 
 
The (now defunct) Circuit Courts (1789-1912) were Article III courts that ran in 
tandem with district courts. The Circuit Courts, which served as both trial courts and 
had appellate jurisdiction, were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. In 1891, the Court 
of Appeals was established as an appellate court for district courts and circuit courts.44  
 
B. Specialized Courts 
 
Congress’s authority to create lower courts and to set their subject-matter 
jurisdiction “necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts to 
particular objects.”45 As with non-specialized and geographically-focused Article III 
 
32 Id. § 1259. 
33 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44. 
34 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 43, §§ 81-132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 
2-3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74; Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826; District of Columbia Court 
Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475. 
35 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 44. Note that there are only 167 judges excluding the specialized Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. 
36 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. § 133. The district courts in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands are not 
included in 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 as they are courts established under Article IV of the Constitution. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 133. 
40 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1332. 
41 See id. §§ 1330-1369.  
42 See id. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). A district court having original jurisdiction over a civil 
action shall have jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the action as to form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III. Id. § 1367(a). 
43 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (taxes by states); id. § 1342 (rate orders of state agencies). 
44 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The circuit courts were abolished by the Judicial Code of 
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. 
45 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812). 
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courts, those with specialized subject-matter jurisdiction carry the judicial power of the 
United States. The requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority having been met, 
the judicial protections of good behavior and set compensation respected, and the case 
or controversy requirement satisfied, such entities carry the full power of the third 
branch of government. Scholars and the Courts agree that it is “uncontroversial that the 
lower courts described in Article III, and created by Congress pursuant to Article I, § 8, 
exercise the judicial power of the United States described in Article III, § 2.”46 
Accordingly, interference by the other branches in the core functioning of Article III 
courts, of any type, violates separation of powers. There are currently six federal Article 
III specialized courts. At least seven additional specialized courts have at one point been 
brought into existence by Congress.47 
 
1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review 
 
Two of the most prominent specialized Article III courts in existence are the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR). Congress created them in 1978 to act as a neutral, third party 
arbiter in approving the collection of domestic electronic surveillance undertaken for 
foreign intelligence purposes.48 Their creation responded to public outcry at the extent 
to which the intelligence community had placed U.S. citizens under surveillance, as 
well as the Supreme Court’s determination that the executive could not engage in 
electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes without some judicial process.49 
Despite its in camera, ex parte emphasis and the absence of adversary parties, from the 
beginning, Congress has consistently considered FISC/FISCR to be an Article III 
court.50 Every court to confront the question has agreed.51 
 
46 David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government Misconduct, 26 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (2005); see Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799); United 
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812). 
47 The U.S. Customs Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Emergency Court of Appeals, 
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Commerce Court, the Special Railroad Court, and the Court 
of Claims.  
48 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1885c). 
49 See id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788; Intelligence Activities: Senate Resolution 21: Hearings Before the S. 
Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel. Activities of the U.S., 94th Cong., 
vol. 5, at 1 (1975); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972). The law provides special 
protections for United States persons. See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(h)(2), (4), 1802(a)(1)(B), 1821(4)(D), 
1822(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
50 Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., 95th Cong. 26 (1978) (Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., to Rep. Edward P. Boland (Apr. 18, 1978), stating FISC/FISCR “will be Article III courts”); id. at 
116 (FISC, comprised of “article III judge[s]” is to be independent “and in no way dependent on the 
executive branch of Government”); id. at 184 (Letter from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy to the Rep. Robert 
McClory (Feb. 10, 1978), stating that FISC is considered within “the constitutional jurisdiction of Article 
III courts.”); see also id. at 213-16, 224 (discussions relating to whether the issues before the court would 
meet Article III requirements as cases or controversies). It continues to do so. See 154 CONG. REC. 804 
(2008) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, alluding to FISC as an Article III court with “inherent 
power” over its own records and balking at the idea that the administration could “withhold FISA Court 
opinions and documents that include significant interpretations of law”); see also id. at 809 (statement of 
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse); ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43746, 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 6 (2014). 
51 See, e.g., In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Ct. of Rev., No. FISCR 18-01, 
GID.CA.00006, at 8, 2018 WL 2709456, at *4 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018) (per curiam); In Re Motion 
for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007); In re Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731-32, GID.CA.00001, at 731-32 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam); United States 
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The role of the court has altered over time. Initially comprised of seven judges 
selected by the Chief Justice from seven of the United States judicial circuits,52 FISC’s 
job was to ascertain whether the government had met its burden of establishing probable 
cause that the target was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and likely to 
use the facility to be placed under surveillance, prior to issuing orders.53 FISCR, 
comprised of three judges designated by the Chief Justice from the United States district 
courts or courts of appeal, was fashioned to serve in an appellate fashion.54 In cases in 
which FISCR denies an application, the Government could file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court.55 In 1994, Congress extended FISC’s authority to 
include ex parte orders for physical search.56 In 1998, it incorporated mechanisms for 
pen register/trap and trace (PR/TT), as well as acquiring business records.57 These laws 
are colloquially referred to as “Traditional FISA.” Under them, FISC initially 
functioned as a warrant-granting body, issuing more than 14,000 orders and just one 
opinion between 1978 and 2001.58 Applications were sealed and procedures conducted 
in camera and ex parte.59  
 
In 2001,  the USA PATRIOT Act made numerous changes to FISA.60 Although it 
retained the size of FISCR at three judges, it expanded the number of FISC judges to 
11, of whom at least three must reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia.61 
Congress expanded the business records provision to give the Court jurisdiction over 
orders to require “the production of any tangible things (including books, records, 
papers, documents, and other items).”62 Whereas before records could be sought only 
from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle 
rental facilities, records now can be sought from any business or entity.63 In 2005, when 
section 215 was set to expire, Congress added language requiring that the government 
establish “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to 
 
v. Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 
1985), aff’d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986). 
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788. 
53 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a); 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Sen. Mathias). 
54 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b). 
55 Id. An electronic communication service provider receiving a directive under Title VII of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act may similarly seek certiorari in the Supreme Court. Id. § 1881a(i)(6)(B). 
56 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423, 
3445 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1822(c)). 
57 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601-02, 112 Stat. 2396, 
2404-12 (1998) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1846, 1861-1864). 
58 See FISA Annual Reports to Congress, 1979-2002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FED’N AM. 
SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (July 28, 2020); In re Application of the U.S. for an Ord. 
Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises & Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISC Ct. June 
11, 1981), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16-19 (1981). 
59 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488 & n.12, GID.C.00021, at 6 & n.12 
(FISA Ct. 2007). 
60 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. See, e.g., id. 
§§ 206-208, 214-215, 218, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. at 282-83, 286-88, 291, 364-65, 392. 
61 Id. § 208, 115 Stat. at 283. 
62 Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287. 
63 Compare id. with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 
Stat. 2396, 2411 (1998). 
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an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)” prior to FISC granting an 
order.64 
 
In 2008, Congress further expanded the courts’ responsibilities, giving 
FISC/FISCR oversight over the domestic collection of the communications of non-U.S. 
persons, as well as U.S. persons, believed to be overseas.65 These changes, which 
entailed oversight of acquisition, minimization, retention, and use of the information 
obtained, heralded a significant shift in the court’s role: so-called “Modernized FISA” 
ushered in an era of bulk and programmatic collection of citizens’ and non-U.S. 
persons’ data.66 In light of new technologies, the government sought novel statutory and 
doctrinal interpretations, forcing the FISC/FISCR to consider constitutional and 
statutory limits and whether government action comported with the law.67 
 
Beset by difficult questions, the courts’ roles have altered.68 Instead of just issuing 
orders, the FISC/FISCR now routinely rule on critically-important First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendment questions.69 Their decisions impact separation of powers, common 
 
64 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 
192, 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861). 
65 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, §§ 702-704, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438-57. 
66 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 
37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of 
International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015); Laura K. 
Donohue, The Case for Reforming Section 702 of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (June 26, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/case-reforming-section-702-us-foreign-
intelligence-surveillance-law. 
67 As Presiding Judge John Bates explained on one such occasion, “The current application relies on [the] 
prior framework, but also seeks to expand authorization in ways that test the limits of what the applicable 
FISA provisions will bear.” Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00092, at 4 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) [hereinafter Bates Mem. Op.]; see also Opinion and Order, 
[REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00091, at 1-2 (FISA Ct.) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“This 
application seeks authority for a much broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace 
applications.”); Order, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00016, at 12 & n.5 (FISA Ct. 
May 31, 2007) (Vinson, J.) (arguing for collection not just to or from but also about a selector); Order 
and Memorandum Opinion, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00012, at 16 (FISA Ct. 
Apr. 3, 2007) (Vinson, J.) (arguing an expanded understanding of “facility” and stating that the NSA 
makes the probable cause finding for selectors); Primary Order, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00038 (FISA Ct.) (Walton, J.) (seeking bulk production of Internet metadata 
using PR/TT); Supplemental Opinion and Amendment to Primary Order, [REDACTED], No. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00136, at 3-4 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (“Under the expansive interpretation of the 
relevant statutory provisions put forward by the government, the limitations may not have been 
warranted. But after careful consideration, the Court adopted a less expansive interpretation of the 
statute.”) 
68 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act §§ 206, 208, 214-215, 218, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. at 282, 283, 286-88, 
291, 364-65, 392; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, § 106, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006); Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436; see also In re Directives to 
Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, 
GID.C.00025, at 3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.) (noting “the [Protect America Act of 2007] . . . 
is hardly a model of legislative clarity or precision.”); Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033, at 2-3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) (Walton, J.) 
(addressing tension between 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702-2703). 
69 See, e.g., Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA 
Amends. Act of 2008, No. Misc 08-01, GID.C.00028, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) 
(McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments); Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior Decisions, 
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112 (FISA Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (Fifth Amendment); 
Memorandum, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and 
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law, and the rule of law. The Court examines complex matters of statutory 
construction.70 And it monitors how the government wields its power.71 FISC/FISCR 
opinions reveal the extent to which government actions comport with—or violate—
court directions and the law.72  
 
An important and robust body of law is now emerging from a court that, for 
decades, has been largely shielded from public inspection.73 Nearly 100 declassified 
FISC/FISCR opinions and 300 orders are now in the public domain, as are hundreds of 
FISC/FISCR filings. Non-specialized Article III courts, moreover, are increasingly 
having to grapple with FISA and to integrate FISC jurisprudence into their decisions.  
 
2. Alien Terrorist Removal Court 
 
In 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated what would become 
a 20-year effort to deport seven Palestinian men and a Kenyan woman suspected of 
being members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a radical wing of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization.74 The L.A. Eight became emblematic of the 
difficulties entailed in using classified evidence in deportation cases.75 In response, the 
Reagan Administration proposed the creation of a special court to handle classified 
evidence and removal of aliens.76 Similar to the FISC/FISCR, the new court would be 
 
Fourth Amendments); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. 2002) (Fourth 
Amendment). 
70 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033. 
71 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00050, at 10-11 (FISA 
Ct. 2009) (Hogan, J.). 
72 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3-4 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) 
(Walton, J.) (NSA sent query results to email list of 189 analysts, “only 53 of whom had received the 
required training”); Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 15-18, 
78-80 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.) (NSA misled Court, violating FISA and the Fourth 
Amendment); Bates Mem. Op., GID.C.00092, at 3, 18, 100-105 (“NSA exceeded the scope of authorized 
acquisition continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years of acquisition”; FBI, CIA, and NCTC 
“accessed unminimized U.S. person information”; NSA disseminated “reports containing U.S. person 
information”; government requested permission to violate law); Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], 
No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00078, at 26-27 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2012) (NSA misrepresented upstream 
collection, acquiring U.S. person domestic communications). 
73 More than two decades after its 1981 opinion, the Court issued two opinions. In re Sealed Case, 310 
F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, GID.C.00002 (FISA Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001. It published two more opinions between 2007 and 2008. In re Directives 
[REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 
GID.CA.00002 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 
GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007). 
74 Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. Defendants Cleared, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2007), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-01-me-palestinian1-story.html. 
75 The immigrants in that case had been distributing Al Hadaf, the Popular Front’s magazine, which was 
also available in public libraries and the U.S. Library of Congress. Id. Initially charged under the 
McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter Act (which had not been used since the 1950s), six of the non-U.S. 
residents quickly had the charges dropped against them, with technical visa violations alleged in their 
place. Phyllis Bennis, Ten Years of the Los Angeles Eight Deportation Case: Interview with David Cole, 
MIDDLE E. REP., Winter 1997, at 41, 41; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 
66 Stat. 163. The two permanent U.S. residents were then charged with associating with an organization 
advocating the destruction of property. Bennis, supra note 75. 
76 Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 22, 2002, at 1, 1, https://s3.us-east-
2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf (although the claim is not 
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comprised of sitting U.S. District Court judges selected by the Chief Justice.77 It was 
not until the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
however, and passage of the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, that 
Congress created the specialized Article III court.78 Later in the year, further revisions 
allowed for removal proceedings to proceed even where the court deemed the proposed 
unclassified summary inadequate.79 
 
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) consists of 5 district court judges 
appointed by the Chief Justice from 5 of the U.S. judicial circuits.80 Currently, four of 
the five federal judges currently on the court are also members of the FISC.81 The judges 
serve five year terms, are eligible for re-designation, and may be jointly appointed to 
the FISC/FISCR.82 The court’s decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia and eligible for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.83 
The Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General must certify the application with a 
statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the DOJ to establish probable 
cause that an alien is an “alien terrorist” (as described in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(4)(B)) 
and physically present in the United States, and removal under the regular immigration 
provisions would pose a risk to national security.84 Where these conditions are met, the 
judge is required to issue an order granting the application.85 Denial must be 
accompanied by a written statement of the reasons.86 
 
Although the measures have been in place for nearly a quarter of a century, the 
Attorney General has never applied to the ATRC to remove an alien terrorist, with the 
result that the court has never conducted a proceeding.87 One theory as to why this is 
the case highlights built-in procedural flaws: namely, that there is no other “recourse to 
remove [lawful permanent residents] against whom the sole evidence of their terrorist 
identity is FISA-obtained or derived from foreign intelligence information or is not 
 
footnoted in the article, the author served from 1988 to 1993 in the Reagan and Bush Administrations as 
the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Immigration Litigation in the U.S. 
Department of Justice Civil Division). 
77 Id. at 2. 
78 Congress refused to hold hearings. See id. Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Senator 
Robert Smith (R-N.H.) proposed an amendment to the 1994 crime bill to establish the terrorist removal 
court. Although a voice vote carried it, during the Senate Conference, the provision was dropped. Id. The 
following year, Smith re-introduced it as a standalone bill. See Alien Terrorist Removal Act of 1995, S. 
270, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), on behalf of the Clinton Administration, similarly 
introduced the Omnibus Counterterrorism bill, a bipartisan bill. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, 
S. 390, 104th Cong. (1995). See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, sec. 401, §§ 501-507, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-
1537 (West)). 
79 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 354, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
641 to 3009-644 (1996). 
80 8 U.S.C.A. § 1532(a). 
81 See Alien Terrorist Removal Courts: Judges  ̧FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-
terrorist-removal-court-judges (last visited Dec. 31, 2020); Current Membership – Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN INTEL. SURVEILLANCE CT., https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-
membership (last visited Dec. 31, 2020). 
82 8 U.S.C.A. § 1532(a)-(b). 
83 Id. § 1535. 
84 Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D). 
85 Id. § 1533(c)(2). 
86 Id. § 1533(c)(3). 
87 Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 1996-Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-
terrorist-removal-court-1996-present (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (current as of 2018). 
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appropriate for declassification or public acknowledgement.”88 While the statute 
authorizes the use of FISA-derived information in the proceedings, where the court does 
not approve of the government’s proposed unclassified summary of key evidence, the 
court has to find two conditions: “(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United 
States would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death 
or serious bodily injury to any person, and (II) the provision of the summary would 
likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious 
bodily injury to any person.”89 Because the court must make both findings, the 
government is left in the “same type of ‘Catch-22’ dilemma that justified the ATRC’s 
creation” in the first place: i.e., “disclosing and risking sources and methods . . . versus 
the removal alien terrorists.”90  
 
3. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit91 
 
Historically, federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over cases related to 
federal patent law and copyrights.92 In the late 1970s and early 1980s though, 
corporations, government attorneys, and academics convinced Congress that creating a 
single appellate court for patent cases would help to create consistency and to relieve 
the pressure on district courts for cases involving complex litigation and detailed 
technical expertise.93 In 1982, Congress responded by creating the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, merging the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
and the appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims.94 It consists of twelve judges 
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.95  
 
The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases in which the district 
court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338. This includes: (a) civil actions 
related to patents or plant variety protection; (b) certain appeals of claims against the 
United States (c) appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; (d) appeals from 
decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or the U.S. Court of International 
Trade; and (e) review of certain agency decisions and appeals linked to particular 
statutory authorities (e.g., § 211 of the 1970 Economic Stabilization Act, § 5 of the 1973 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, and § 506(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act).96 
The court also has jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions.97 Accordingly, one scholar 
has proposed that the D.C. and Federal Circuits are more properly considered “semi-
 
88 Aram A. Gavoor & Timothy M. Belsan, The Forgotten FISA Court: Exploring the 
Inactivity of the ATRC, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 141-42 (2020). 
89 8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii). 
90 Gavoor & Belsan, supra note 88, at 142. 
91 The Court of Claims, one of the precursors to the Federal Circuit, is discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 129-135. Further related history can be found infra Part III.C. discussing the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims.   
92 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338. 
93 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 NYU L. REV. 
1, 1-2, 6-7 (1989). 
94 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
95 28 U.S.C.A. § 44. 
96 Id. § 1295. The court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the inhabited territorial courts (i.e., 
Guam, the Virgin Islands and the North Mariana Islands, with the exception of matters related to the 
subjects listed. 
97 Id. § 1292. 
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specialized,” as significant portions of their dockets deal with issues outside narrow 
categories such as administrative and patent law.98  
 
The court operates under a modified version of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, referred to as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Rules of 
Practice.99 Although initially the Supreme Court allowed the Federal Circuit court to 
operate fairly freely, in recent years it has begun to take a stronger stand, reversing a 
number of the court’s decisions on substantive grounds.100 In 2017, for instance, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in seven cases, six of which it reversed in whole or 
part.101 
 
4. U.S. Court of International Trade 
 
The U.S. Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over any civil 
actions arising under certain sections of the 1930 Tariff Act, 1974 Trade Act, and the 
1979 Trade Agreements Act; rulings issued by the Secretary of the Treasury related to 
certain decisions impacting trade; any law providing for revenue from imports or 
tonnage, tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on imports; and restrictions on imports.102 
Congress created it in 1980 to reorganize the predecessor Customs Court. It consists of 
nine judges (not more than 5 of whom can be from the same political party—a 
requirement that raises constitutional concerns), appointed by the President by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.103 The court, which is located in New York, 
possesses “all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district 
court of the United States.”104 
 
5. Specialized Courts No Longer in Existence 
 
 
98 John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-
Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV 553, 553-55 (2010). 
99 FED. CIR. R. (July 1, 2020), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-of-
practice/FederalCircuitRulesofPractice-July2020.pdf. 
100 See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 322 (2015) (reversing the circuit’s 
practice of considering findings of fact de novo); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
393-94 (2006) (rejecting a Federal Circuit application of a “general rule” unique to patent disputes 
instead of using the traditional four-factor test for granting a permanent injunction). 
101 See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017) (consolidating Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195) 
(focused on requirements under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 to provide 
sponsor with a copy of the biologics license application and the sponsor’s recourse for failure to provide 
that information); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (patent 
exhaustion due to conditional and authorized sales); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), aff’g In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (constitutionality of disparaging marks provision of the 
Lanham Act); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017) (infringement liability for 
worldwide sales under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) for supplying a single commodity component); SCA 
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) (availability of 
laches in patent infringement actions); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514 (2017) (patent venue). 
102 28 U.S.C.A. § 1581. It also has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions related to import commenced 
by the United States, related counter-, cross-, and third-party claims, and civil actions under the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Id. §§ 1582-
1584. 
103 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C.A. § 251). 
104 28 U.S.C.A. § 1585. 
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At least seven specialized Article III courts created by Congress no longer exist. 
The first, the United States Customs Court, appears to have been an Article III court 
based on the statute designating it as such in 1956.105 In 1980, the Customs Court was 
replaced by the U.S. Court of International Trade.106  
 
From 1909 to 1929, appeals from the Customs Court (and its predecessor Board of 
U.S. General Appraisers) were made to the Court of Customs Appeals, an article I 
tribunal.107 In 1929, Congress expanded jurisdiction to include patent and trademark 
and changed the court’s name to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.108 29 years 
later, Congress formally designated the court as established under Article III.109 In 1982, 
this court’s functions were subsumed by the then newly created U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.110 
 
During World War II, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 
to stabilize prices and prevent profiteering.111 It created the Emergency Court of 
Appeals, comprised of three or more district or circuit judges selected by the Chief 
Justice, with exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to regulations issued by the Office 
of Price Administration.112 The statute empowered the chief judge (selected by the Chief 
Justice) to divide the court into divisions of three or more judges to render judgment. 
The court was granted “the powers of a district court with respect to the jurisdiction 
conferred on it,” except the court was explicitly denied the authority “to issue any 
temporary restraining order or interlocutory decree staying or restraining, in whole or 
in part, the effectiveness” of certain regulations or orders.113 A petition for a writ of 
certiorari could be filed in the Supreme Court within thirty days of a judgment or order 
by the court.114 Although the court was created as part of a temporary measure, Congress 
repeatedly renewed the authority, expanding its jurisdiction to include review of agency 
decisions under the Housing and Rent Acts of 1948 and 1949 as well as Defense 
Production Act.115 In 1961, the court heard its final case. It formally dissolved April 18, 
1962.116 
 
In 1971, Congress created a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, again 
consisting of three or more judges to be designated by the Chief Justice from the judges 
of the district courts and circuit courts of appeals.117 Like the prior court, the temporary 
 
105 Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-703, 70 Stat. 532. Prior to that time, the U.S. Customs Court was 
considered a legislative court. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1929).   
106 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C.A. § 251). 
107 See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105; Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 457-58. 
108 Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 1, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475. 
109 Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848, 848. 
110  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
111 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204, 56 Stat. 23, 31. 
112 See id. §§ 204(a)-(c), 201, 56 Stat. at 31-32, 29. 
113 Id. § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32. 
114 Id. § 204(d), 56 Stat. at 32. 
115 See Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, sec. 202(d), § 204(e)(4), 62 Stat. 93, 96; Housing and 
Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, sec. 203(d)(5), (e), § 204(e)(1), (e)(4)(E), 63 Stat. 18, 23-24; Defense 
Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, §§ 407(d), 408, 64 Stat. 798, 808-11; see also Emergency Court of 
Appeals, 1942-1962, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/emergency-court-appeals-1942-
1962 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). 
116 See Emergency Court of Appeals, supra note 115. 
117 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, sec. 2, § 211(b), 85 Stat. 743, 
749. 
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one, which operated until 1993,118 served as an Article III court.119 Congress provided 
it with circuit court powers relating to wage and price control programs, with some 
exceptions.120 
 
The controversial (and short-lived) Commerce Court (1910-1913) acted as an 
Article III court as well.121 Largely a pet project of President William Howard Taft, the 
Court had exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to orders issued by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC). Appeal was via a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court. The Court consisted of five judges appointed for overlapping five-year terms.122 
Upon their appointment, the first round of judges simultaneously received appointments 
to different circuit courts of appeal, where they could hear cases as needed. At the 
conclusion of their term, they continued to sit on the circuit court to which they had 
been appointed, with replacements drawn from individuals already appointed to the 
federal bench. Congress provided the Commerce Court with full powers of a circuit 
court in regard to cases within its jurisdiction as well as the ability to “issue all writs 
and process appropriate.”123 The first Chief Judge of the Court, Martin Knapp, had 
previously served as chair of the ICC. He had a clear interest in keeping what he 
perceived of as industrial control of the ICC in check. In reflection of this position, the 
court went on to overturn a number of ICC decisions, which the Supreme Court 
subsequently restored.124 Judge Robert W. Archbald’s impeachment in July 1912 for 
using his position to secure railroad contracts for his cronies generated renewed 
Congressional effort to abolish the court. Taft, however, vetoed the bill.  Nevertheless, 
the following year, with President Woodrow Wilson’s support, Congress eliminated the 
tribunal.125 
 
In the early 1970s, a number of railways in the midwest and northeast of the United 
States filed for bankruptcy. Congress responded by passing the 1974 Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act.126 The statute reorganized railroads into an economically viable 
system, established the U.S. Railway Association and the Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, and provided assistance to states and local and regional transportation 
authorities to promote rail travel. It also established a special court, composed of three 
federal judges assigned by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.127 The judges 
were given the authority to exercise the powers of district court judges. In 1996, 
Congress provided for the abolition of the Court under the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act.128  
 
 
118 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102(d), 106 Stat. 4506, 4507. 
119 See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in 
Petroleum Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. 150, 830 F.2d 198, 202-04 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987), Halleck v. 
Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1251 (D.D.C. 1977).  
120 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of  1971 § 211, 85 Stat. at 748-50; Spinetti v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 522 F.2d 1401, 1403. 
121 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539. 
122 Id. at 540. 
123 Id. at 541. 
124 In four of the Court’s first five cases, it reversed ICC orders, and in each instance, the Supreme Court 
restored the original ICC order. Dan Ernst, The U.S. Commerce Court, 1910-1913, LEGAL HIST. BLOG 
(May 19, 2015), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-us-commerce-court-1910-1913.html. 
125 Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219. 
126 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974). 
127 Id. § 209(b), 87 Stat. at 999-1000. 
128 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 605, 110 Stat. 3847, 3858. 
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The Court of Claims, established in 1855, initially operated as an administrative 
body and, later, as an Article I tribunal.129 The originating statute directed the court to 
hear and determine claims against the U.S. government, as well as claims referred to 
the court by either the Senate or the House of Representatives.130 In 1863, Congress 
authorized the court to render final judgments, from which an appeal could follow under 
certain circumstances.131 In 1953, Congress declared that the Court of Claims was an 
Article III court.132 Nine years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s status 
(along with the Courts of Customs and Patent Appeals), noting that because the judges 
were constitutionally protected in regard to their tenure of office and undiminished 
compensation, they were eligible to sit as Court of Appeals and U.S. District Court 
judges.133 In 1982, however, Congress turned the tribunal back into an Article I Court.134 
It continues to operate as such, subject to review in the (Article III) U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.135 
 
C. Inherent Powers Central to Article III(1) Courts 
 
The inherent powers of all Article III(1) courts are rooted in their constitutional 
responsibility to administer justice and their status as the third branch of government.136 
They divide into inherent powers that (1) ensure the judiciary can fulfill its obligation 
to ensure fairness in the course of adjudication; (2) facilitate the efficient use of judicial 
resources; and (3) protect the integrity, independence, and reputation of the courts. 
Within each category, powers that go to the core of the courts operating in their 
constitutional capacity (i.e., in the exercise of “the judicial power”) are considered 
essential and thus beyond the reach of the other two branches. They are part and parcel 
of the separation of powers that marks the federal system. Such authorities can be 
distinguished from inherent powers that are merely beneficial, in which case Congress 
may have some role to play in their demarcation.137  
 
1. Ensure Fairness and Justice in the Course of Adjudication 
 
Federal courts have certain inherent powers that enable them to fulfill their 
substantive responsibility to ensure fairness and justice in the course of adjudication. 
While Congress may act to facilitate the overall objective, certain authorities do not rely 
on any legislative framing. To obtain equitable results, for instance, courts must be able 
to obtain accurate facts. By extending their purview to cases in equity, Article III(2) 
provides an underlying authority to do this—a power further recognized (but not solely 
constructed) by Congress in the first Judiciary Act.138 Accordingly, Article III(1) courts 
 
129 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612. See infra Part III.C. for further discussion of the 
Court of Claims and U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
130 10 Stat. at 612. 
131 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. 765, 765, 766. 
132 Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-158, 67 Stat. 226. 
133 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-71 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). 
134 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 105, § 171, 96 Stat. 25, 27 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 171 (West)); see also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 
581 (1933). 
135 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 171(a), 1295(a)(3); see also Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-572, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (assigning the name “United States Court of Federal Claims”). 
136 See, e.g., In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) Michaelson v. United States ex. rel. Chicago, St. P., 
M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993). 
137 See supra note 9. 
138 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 19, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
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can appoint auditors, special masters, and commissioners to make investigations.139 
They can use discovery procedures in habeas cases.140 Article III judges can allow post-
trial depositions.141 They can require the production of witness statements and parties 
to attend hearings regarding missing evidence.142 They can make in limine rulings.143 
Article III entities have inherent authority to exclude, admit, or strike evidence or 
exhibits on grounds of fairness.144 They also have the inherent power to issue and 
answer letters rogatory to obtain evidence from an individual within the jurisdiction of 
a foreign court.145 This is done as a matter of parity between the judicial functions of 
internationally-recognized governments.146 
 
Pari passu, lower courts have recognized the judiciary’s power to ensure that 
matters of law are addressed. For example, they can require parties to enter memoranda 
of law.147 They can require counsel to serve standby.148 They can require parties to retain 
a lawyer.149 They can assign attorneys for pretrial actions.150 And they can appoint amici 
curiae.151 For the sake of consistency, courts have the power, derived from common 
law, to ensure stare decisis as a matter of both horizontal and vertical parity.152 
 
The courts have further inherent authorities related to the conduct of trials. They 
can, for instance, withdraw a juror mid-trial where it would be “a total failure of justice 
if the trial proceed.”153 They can fine jurors who try to leave without permission.154 
They can discharge a jury from delivering a verdict.155 They can excise jury 
determinations and order a reduction in an excessive verdict.156 Notably, nowhere can 
 
139 See Peterson, 253 U.S. at 304-07, 312-14 (1920); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 
1982), amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer 
v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127-29 
(1864). 
140 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969). 
141 United States ex rel. Consol. Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 929 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
142 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985). 
143 Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). 
144 Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992); Walker v. 
Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 712 (4th Cir. 1986); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 
585 F.2d 877, 897-98 (8th Cir. 1978). 
145 In re Letter Rogatory from Just. Ct., Dist. of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562, 564 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t 
has been held that federal courts have inherent power to issue and respond to letters rogatory.”) (citing 
United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292 
(9th Cir. 1958); In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 256-57 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)). 
146 In re Letter Rogatory, 523 F.2d at 563 n.1 (quoting The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941)). 
147 Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980). 
148 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993). 
149 See J.D. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201, 1208-09 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
150 In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1977). 
151 In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1937). 
152 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
153 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858). 
154 Offutt v. Parrott, 18 F. Cas. 606, 607 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 10,453) (fining a juror who jumped out a 
window to try to escape jury service). 
155 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). 
156 The first recorded use of remittitur was by Justice Joseph Story. See Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578); see also Barrett, supra note 9, at 829. Even though the rules provide for 
the grant of a new trial, it remains a judicial power. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
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remittitur be found in statutory form.157 They can rescind a discharge order and recall 
the jury for further deliberation.158 So, too, can they mediate the impact of common law 
rules of procedure.159 These powers are not established by Congress. They are entirely 
within the courts’ authority qua the judicial branch of government. 
 
Article III(1) courts also have the (essential) power to make decisions that are not 
subject to control by the other branches. When they act in this core judicial capacity, 
separation of powers prevents the other branches from interfering. To give effect to 
their determinations, this extends to the ability to control and review their decisions. If 
it did not, the other branches could simply intervene after the fact effectively nullify 
judicial decisionmaking by preventing it from reaching the public domain. As a 
consequence, as the Supreme Court explained in Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
“Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files.”160 They can seal, 
unseal, revoke, or rescind orders.161 They can modify or lift protective orders.162 This 
power persists even when jurisdiction over the relevant controversy has ended.163 
Jurisdiction over the sealed record is not lost when the case is appealed.164 
 
2. Facilitate the Efficient Use of Resources  
 
In 1936, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent authority of the judiciary to 
manage its affairs with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.165 
In 2017, the Court reiterated its position, noting that the judiciary has the power, 
conferred by neither rules nor statutes, “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the 
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”166 While dockets may in many 
circumstances be mandatory (excepting, for instance, the certiorari process), Article III 
courts control how that docket is handled.167  
 
 
157 Barrett, supra note 9, at 829. Remittur is constitutionally assigned to the Courts in their Article III(2) 
grant of equitable authority. In contrast, additur, which is not an equitable remedy, has not been allowed 
in federal court. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
158 Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1890 (2016). 
159 See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933). 
160 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 
F.3d 133, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 
F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983). 
161 Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1943); United States v. 
Seugasala, 670 F. App’x 641, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2016) (mem.); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 
983 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1987). This includes the 
authority to revoke orders granting bail. Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961). 
162 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Poliquin v. Garden Way, 
Inc. 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] protective order, like any ongoing injunction, is always 
subject to the inherent power of the district court to relax or terminate the order, even after judgment.”); 
Gambale, 377 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 143-45). 
163 United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As long as a 
protective order remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to modify it, even if 
the underlying suit has been dismissed.”) 
164 Seugasala, 670 F. App’x at 641. 
165 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 
166 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 
370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)); see also In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002); Arthur 
Pierson & Co., v. Provimi Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1989). 
167 Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1805, 1805 (1995)). 
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Article III(1) courts can, for instance, demand that defense counsel commit to a date 
for trial.168 They determine the order in which issues will be considered.169 They can 
initiate proceedings by declaring parties ready for trial.170 They can consolidate 
questions involving common law and fact171 as well as entire cases.172 Relatedly, they 
can stay an action pending the completion of a related action in another court.173 Courts 
can restrict pretrial hearing length.174 And they can implement a range of restrictions in 
the conduct of trial, such as limits on the number of expert witnesses.175 They can 
require parties to have representatives with settlement authority.176 They can limit the 
amount of time counsel can speak.177 On similar grounds (and subject to appellate 
review), courts on their own authority can dismiss an action on grounds of forum non 
conveniens—despite the fact that a parallel authority has been established statutorily.   
 
3. Protect the Integrity, Independence, and Reputation of the Judiciary 
 
As their own branch of government Article III(I) courts also have the inherent power to 
protect the integrity, independence, and reputation of the judiciary. Like matters that go 
to the heart of adjudication, these authorities are protected, under separation of powers 
doctrine, from interference by the other branches. The judiciary, for instance, has the 
inherent authority to prevent fraud on the court. They can launch their own, independent 
investigation.178 And they can set aside decisions if they are later found to be rooted in 
fraudulent representation.179 This power is rooted in the extension of Supreme Court 
jurisdiction to cases in equity under Article III(2). Along similar lines, Article III(1) 
courts have the inherent authority to sanction contumacious behavior, such as failure to 
 
168 United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1998). 
169 Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998). 
170 See Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 732 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984). 
171 Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1876). This power was later acknowledged by statute. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 42(a).  
172 MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958). 
173 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); La. Power & 
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 
(1943); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). 
174 See J.S. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
175 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir. 1983). But see United States v. 
Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2005). 
176 In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 
1407 (11th Cir. 1991); Luis C. Forteza e Hijos, Inc. v. Mills, 534 F.2d 415, 418-19 (1st Cir. 1976). 
177 See United States v. Maloof, 205 F.3d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 
964-65 (5th Cir. 1997); Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1996). 
178 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). 
179 As the Supreme court explained, the “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten 
judgments” is central to judicial integrity because “tampering with the administration of justice in [this] 
manner . . . involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set 
up to protect and safe-guard the public.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Harford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
245, 246 (1946)); see also Universal Oil Prods. Co, 328 U.S. at 580 (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 238; 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245, 246). 
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prosecute.180 The judiciary can penalize parties for litigating in bad faith.181 The court 
can fine an attorney when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.”182 It goes to the court’s ability to ensure that its own operations are 
regarded as just. It thus “transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations 
between the parties and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself.”183 Even where 
there are procedural rules in place, courts can impose sanctions under their inherent 
powers.184 This includes sanctioning a party for “delaying or disrupting the litigation, 
or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”185 And courts can go further: in some 
circumstances, they can dismiss an appeal or complaint entirely.186 
 
Contempt, too, falls within this category. Traditionally, it has been understood to 
mean misconduct in the presence of the court, disobeying court orders, or misbehavior 
by judicial officers. Despite considerable legislation governing this area, there are 
numerous cases in which the Court has underscored its own, inherent authority, distinct 
from the statutory basis.187  In 1821, the Court explained that Article III entities are 
“universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose 
silence, respect and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, 
and as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the 
approach and insults of pollution.”188 Certain “auxiliary and subordinate” powers can 
be exercised by the courts where they are “indispensable to the attainment of the ends” 
specified.189 In 1874, it wrote:  
 
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is 
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the 
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently 
to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States 
 
180 For example, in 1962, following repeated prosecutorial delays, the Court explained that its authority 
“to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution [is] an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but 
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see also 
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31). 
181 This is one of the ancient powers of the courts, which dates back (at least) to the early 17th century. 
See An Acte to Reforme the Multitudes and Misdemeanors of Attorneyes and Sollicitors at Lawe, 3 Jac. 
c. 7 (1605) (Eng.); 1 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, AND COMMON 
PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 60-61 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 4th Am. ed. 1856). 
The Supreme Court first recognized this power in 1824 and has frequently reaffirmed it. See Ex parte 
Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183-84 (2017) 
(holding that federal courts have inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct). 
182 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. 
v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). See also Pushaw, Jr., supra note 9, 
at 765 (referring to sanctioning for contumacious behavior as a “comprehensive legislative sanctioning 
scheme”). 
183 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. 
184 Id. at 49-50. 
185 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978). 
186 See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 
565-66 (6th Cir. 1995); D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1984). 
187 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (giving federal judges “discretion” to punish “by 
fine or imprisonment . . . all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the court.”); United 
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997) (citing common law roots of judicial authority). 
188 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821). 
189 Id. at 225-26. 
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were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they 
became possessed of this power.190  
 
Fifty years later, the Court reiterated its position, recognizing that it had a duty to punish 
for contempt.191 Without the ability to enforce its orders, the Court could not function. 
As it later explained, “The underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was 
not . . . merely the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the 
orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the 
conduct of trial.”192 They similarly can sanction attorneys for “willful disobedience of 
a court order.”193 This authority goes to the essential power of Article III(1) entities as 
the judicial branch of government. 
 
The range of options available is broad: courts can appoint an attorney to prosecute 
defendants for criminal contempt. They can levy the cost of litigation.194 They can bar 
individuals disrupting a trial from the courtroom.195 Judges can require silence, respect, 
and decorum in their presence.196 And they can influence bar admission and 
discipline.197 While such power “ought to be exercised with great caution,” it is 
nevertheless “incidental to all Courts.”198 
III. ENUMERATED POWERS TRIBUNALS: ARTICLE I(8)  
 
The earliest doctrinal distinction between Article III courts and Article I courts is said 
to have come in 1828 with the Supreme Court’s decision in American Insurance Co. v. 
Canter.199 In it, the Court had to determine the legal status of the Superior Court of 
Florida, a territorial court established by Congress. It concluded that the legislature 
could carve out a domain not subject to Article III. In his analysis, Chief Justice 
Marshall underscored the fact that upon appointment to the territorial court, judges did 
not enjoy life tenure. Instead, they held office for four years: 
 
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power 
conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. 
They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue 
 
190 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874). 
191 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (“[A] judge must have and exercise [powers of 
contempt] in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice, and in maintaining the authority and 
dignity of the court.”). See also Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 
U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (“[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all court, has been many times 
decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice.”). 
192 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987). See also Shillitani v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
193 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). See also Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (“[T]he inherent power extends to a full range of litigation 
abuses.”) 
194 Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923). 
195 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 346-47 (1970); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Illinois, 
397 U.S. 337). 
196 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.), 204, 227 (1821); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Anderson 
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 227). 
197 See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
766 (1980). 
198 Burr, 22 U.S. at 531; see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42-43 (quoting Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. at 531); 
cf. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 
(1812) (some implied powers are “necessary to the exercise of all others”)).  
199 Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
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of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue 
of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, 
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with 
which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in 
the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution 
of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the 
United States.200 
 
Although Article III reserved “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” to courts 
established under its auspices, “the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In 
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general [i.e., 
federal], and . . . state government.”201 Legislative courts could therefore be 
distinguished both by the constitutional protections extended to the judges, as well as 
the type of power being exercised.  
 
Marshall’s endorsement of the legitimacy of the Floridian territorial court in Canter 
relied on the text of Article IV, as well as “the general right of sovereignty” residing in 
government. Reference to this case as establishing the distinction between Article III 
and “Article I” courts therefore can only amount to a shorthand way of saying that 
territorial courts are brought into being by Congress. The authority underpinning their 
creation derives from a different part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Canter is 
frequently cited in reference to the distinction between Article III courts and what are 
referred to as “Article I”, “legislative”, or “non-constitutional” tribunals.  
 
Certainly, there is an important distinction to be drawn: Article I tribunals cannot 
exercise the judicial power of the United States, even as, under separation of powers 
doctrine, the other branches cannot interfere in the inner workings of Article III entities. 
Courts thus must at times delineate which entities fall into which category.202 In the 
1864 case of Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the status of the 
Court of Claims.203 Initially, Chief Justice Taney determined that because it was 
essentially a legislative body, no appeal would lie from it to the Supreme Court.204 
Taney died in 1864, before his decision issued.205 In 1865, the case was reargued. While 
the decision was pending, Congress repealed the statutory language to which Taney had 
pointed to deny jurisdiction.206 The Court, accordingly, shifted its position and claimed 
jurisdiction over final judgments from the court.207  
 
In the time that has elapsed since Gordon, Supreme Court authority over the rulings 
of legislative courts has turned on the type of proceeding and the finality of the 
judgment. The Court does not review administrative proceedings. But where legislative 
courts exercise judicial proceedings, carry a final decision, and involve the exercise of 
 
200 Id. at 546. 
201 Id. 
202 See, e.g., Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) 
(“The Customs Court was an Article I court, while this court, as a result of the Customs Act of 1980, is 
an Article III court, with the same power as a district court.”); Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex. 
Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 678 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting the language from Giorgio). 
203 See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). 
204 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 698-700, 706 (1864), appending 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). 
205 United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 477-78 (1886). 
206 See Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9. 
207 De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867); see also Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court 
exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims). 
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Article III judicial functions, federal courts may have appellate jurisdiction.208 In the 
2018 case Ortiz v. United States, for example, the Court reaffirmed that the military 
justice system is essentially judicial in character.209 The rationale behind the Court’s 
determination is that where Article III jurisdiction is being exercised, then Article III 
protections are necessary. 
 
The constitutional nexus for courts in this category lies in Article I(8)’s explicit 
grant of powers to the legislature. Most prominently, Article I(8)(9) provides for 
Congress “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Two points here 
deserve notice:  first, as a substantive matter, the laws and types of issues to come before 
entities created under Article I(8)(9) is cabined by the powers granted to the legislature 
in Article I(8). These types of courts, accordingly, find root both in Article I(8)(9) and 
in the other enumerated powers of Article I(8).  
 
Second, the language of Article I(8)(9) departs in significant ways from Article 
III(1), in which “the judicial power” may be vested “in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” To “ordain” is to order, or to 
officially decree the status of something or someone. Thus, under Article III(1), it is up 
to Congress to determine—i.e., to ordain—which courts are inferior to the Supreme 
Court and thereby carry the judicial power. Congress thus creates and designates which 
courts constitute the third branch. In contrast, the use of the word “tribunals” in Article 
I(8)(9) suggests the power to constitute adjudicatory bodies that do not necessarily 
exercise “the judicial power,” but which ultimately (because of their inferiority) fall 
under Supreme Court jurisdiction.210 This power, then, is the heart of Congress’s 
authority, as cabined by the substantive, enumerated powers, to create Article I(8) courts 
wherein appeal is to Article III. 
 
Consistent with this clause, Congress has acted under a number of its authorities to 
constitute Article I(8)(9) tribunals. Under Article I(8)(17), which establishes 
Congressional control over the territory in which the seat of government is located, 
Congress has established courts in the District of Columbia.211 Other specialized Article 
I(8)(9) tribunals focus on taxation,212 bankruptcy,213 post offices and roads,214 copyrights 
and patents,215 and the constitution and governance of the military and militia.216 An 
associated implied power relates to Congressional authority over immigration, under 
which it has created immigration tribunals.217 Article I(8)(18) goes on to provide 
residual power to constitute the tribunals in a manner consistent with what is necessary 
 
208 See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172-81 (2018); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 
(1944); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983). Note that this is also the position 
that Congress appears to endorse. CONG. RSCH. SERV., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 673 (Centennial ed. 2017).  
209 Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2174. 
210 See also Pfander, supra note 7 (underscoring the distinction between “court” and “tribunal”). 
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
212 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
213 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
214 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.  
215 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
216 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (captures on land and water); cl. 12 (raise and support armies); cl 13 (provide and 
maintain a Navy), cl. 14 (make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces); 
and, cls. 15-16 (militia). 
217 The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581, 603-4 (1889). 
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and proper to give effect to the substantive enumerated powers, as well as to bring the 
tribunals themselves into operation. 
 
A final point to make about Article I(8)(9) tribunals in contrast to other types of 
federal courts is the temporal priority afforded to the legislature: Congress is the first 
actor in bringing such tribunals into existence. In this sense, these entities differ from 
the Article II(2)/I(8)(3) treaty bodies, which can best be understood in terms of hybrid 
powers. In the latter case, the Executive acts in the first instance to reach international 
agreement, as a necessary but not sufficient precondition to Congress acting on its 
Commerce Clause authorities to bring such entities into being. See discussion, Part V, 
infra. They are not thus properly solely creatures of the legislative branch. A brief 
discussion of the enumerated courts follows. 
 
A. District of Columbia: Article I(8)(17) 
 
The status of the courts of the District of Columbia has alternated over time. A 
series of decisions in the late 19th and early 20th century underscored the position of 
the tribunals as legislative courts, established under Congress’s plenary power to govern 
the District of Columbia.218 Congress could therefore assign them non-judicial 
functions. For instance, the Supreme Court of the District (renamed in 1936 the District 
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia)219 held revisory powers over 
patent issues, with decisions binding on the Commissioner of Patents.220 It held similar 
authority over public utilities commissions fixed rates,221 as the D.C. Court of Appeals 
had over orders of the Federal Radio Commission.222 
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had previously stated in dictum that the courts of 
the District of Columbia were legislative (i.e., non-Article III) courts,223 in 1933 it held 
that they were constitutional courts, exercising the full judicial power of the United 
States when they adjudicated cases or controversies under Article III.224 
Simultaneously, insofar as the courts carried non-judicial functions, they comported 
with Congress’s U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 powers.225 The Supreme Court considered 
Article III, § 1 as limiting these authorities only in regard to tenure and compensation, 
but not in regard to vesting legislative and administrative powers in the courts. The 
Court explained, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with a 
variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state Legislature has in conferring jurisdiction 
on its courts.”226 
 
 
218 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468 (1930) 
(“[T]he courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution 
but are legislative courts.”); see also Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
894, 899-903 (1930). 
219 Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921. 
220 Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 60 (1884). 
221 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 438-40, 442-44 (1923). 
222 Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. at 466-68. 
223 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). 
224 O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933), superseded by statute, District of Columbia 
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475 
(codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (West 2019)). 
225 O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 545-46. 
226 Id. at 545. 
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In 1970, Congress passed a statute that distinguished between Washington D.C.’s 
Article III courts (the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), and Article 
I courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia).227 It assigned matters of local concern to the local court system, 
in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted as the highest court. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was given jurisdiction of appeals 
from judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on matters related to 
federal criminal law.228 Three years later, the Supreme Court upheld this distinction in 
Palmore v. United States.229 The defendant, who had been convicted by the Superior 
Court of D.C. of a felony in violation of the D.C. Code, argued that he had a 
Constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge. The Court disagreed: 
 
[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national 
applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper 
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress 
to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and 
warranting distinctive treatment.230  
 
Article I(8)(17) included the authority to try local criminal cases before judges who did 
not have life tenure or protections against an undiminished salary. Pari passu, state 
courts, as well as territorial courts, could take on questions relating to federal law.  
 
The current Superior Court of the District of Columbia is comprised of a chief judge 
and 61 associate judges nominated by the President after recommendation from the 
District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission.231 The commission operates by 
releasing a notice of any judicial vacancy and then provides three names to the President 
for each opening, one of which the President selects.232 That individual is then 
confirmed by the Senate for terms of 15 years.233 The court has jurisdiction over any 
civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in D.C.234 It also has jurisdiction 
over certain criminal matters, violations of the rules and regulations of the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, certain child custody cases, the issuance of 
warrants for arrest, search or seizure or electronic surveillance in connection with 
crimes and offences committed within Washington, D.C., or for administrative 
inspections linked to public health, safety, and welfare.235  It has subpoena authority and 
contempt power.236 The court’s business is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as modified by the court. Any 
changes, however, must be approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.237  
 
 
227 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act § 111, 84 Stat. at 475 (codified at 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (West 2019)). 
228 Sec. 111, 84 Stat. at 476; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-301. 
229 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 406-07, 410 (1973). 
230 Id. at 407-408. 
231 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-903, 1-204.33. 
232 See id. § 1204.34(d). 
233 Id. § 1204.31(c). 
234 Id. § 11-921. 
235 Id. §§ 11-923, 11-924, 11-925, 11-941. 
236 Id. §§ 11-942, 11-944. 
237 Id. § 11-946. 
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The court’s decisions are reviewable by the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals,238 which is comprised of a chief justice and eight associate justices appointed 
in the same manner and for the same period as judges of the Superior Court.239 Its 
business is conducted according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, with 
whatever modifications the court makes to them.240 As the highest court for the District 
of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the equivalent of a state supreme court, with 
its decisions reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court on matters of federal law. 
 
B. Military 
 
The use of military tribunals derives from English history in which the ability of 
the Crown to constitute such tribunals transformed over time to a Parliamentary power. 
Prior to the Glorious Revolution and establishment of the English Bill of Rights, the 
Crown promulgated its own Articles of War, which established rules for the conduct of 
the military and the procedures for trying their violation.241 An exercise of royal 
prerogative, such rules issued at the start of hostilities and ceased operation thereafter.242 
Martial law held no quarter in peacetime.243 In 1689, however, despite the defeat of 
James II, a significant portion of the British army remained loyal to him. Parliament 
passed its first Mutiny Act, reflecting both the constitutional principle forbidding 
standing armies absent Parliamentary consent, and that, as a practical matter, the 
contemporary instability required the keeping of forces “for the Safety of the Kingdome 
for the Common Defence of the Protestant Religion and for the reduceing [sic] of 
Ireland.”244 The legislation made desertion, mutiny, and sedition a crime.245 Thereafter, 
in recognition of the prohibition against standing armies, Parliament annually renewed 
the statute.246 
 
The Crown continued to issue Articles of War in the context of active hostilities, 
with the result that by the time of the American Revolution, a complex set of rules had 
emerged.247 Colonial legislatures followed Britain’s lead by passing regulations for 
disciplining their militias.248 In the colony of Virginia, the House of Burgesses lifted 
language directly from the English statute, providing for courts-martial “to inflict 
 
238 Id. § 11-721. 
239 See id. §§ 11-702, 1-204.31(c);  For the current designation of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, see District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 111, Pub. L. No. 
91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 (West 2019)). 
240 D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-743. 
241 Such Articles were issued, for instance, by Charles I in 1629 and 1639; Charles II in 1666 during the 
conflict with the Dutch; and James II in 1685 in the context of Monmouth’s Rebellion. See also FRANCIS 
LIEBER & G. NORMAN LIEBER, TO SAVE THE COUNTRY: A LOST TREATISE ON MARIAL LAW 110-11, 114-
17 (Will Smiley & John Fabian Witt eds., 2019); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 
4-8 (rev. & enlarged 2d ed. 1920); W.S. Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered, 18 L.Q. REV. 
117, 118-21 (1902). 
242 Eugene O. Porter, The Articles of War, 8 HISTORIAN 77, 84 (1946). 
243 Petition of Right 1628, 3. Car. c. 1, art. VII. 
244 Mutiny Act 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 5. 
245 Id. 
246 See, e.g., Mutiny Act 1764, 4 Geo. 3 c. 3; Mutiny Act 1765, 5 Geo. 3 c. 7; Mutiny Act 1766, 6 Geo. 3 
c. 8; Mutiny Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 10; Mutiny Act 1768, 8 Geo. 3 c. 3. 
247 See Mutiny Act 1776, 16 Geo. 3 c. 2. 
248 See, e.g., Mutiny Act (Pa. 1756), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-06-02-0189; 
An Act for preventing Mutiny and Desertion (Va. 1757), 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE 
YEAR 1619, at 87 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1820). 
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corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb, on any soldier for immoralities, 
misbehaviour, or neglect of duty.”249 The Massachusetts Bay code of military justice, 
similarly adopted by Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and 
South Carolina, reflected the British Code of 1765.250 
 
At the drafting of the Constitution, the authority to form a military and to issue rules 
for its operation transferred to Congress through Articles I(8)(10), (11), (14), and (16). 
Nine Article I(8) courts currently in existence,251 and numerous courts over the course 
of U.S. history, have been introduced under these authorities. They divide into three 
categories, each of which has a distinct history, constitutional grounding, and appellate 
structure: courts-martial, military commissions, and veterans’ benefits courts, each of 
which is discussed below. Military tribunals can be further distinguished from the other 
Article I(8) courts in that they depend for their execution (in part) upon the President’s 
position of the Executive as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States.”252 
 
1. Courts-martial: Articles I(8)(14) and (16) 
 
The first category of military tribunal regulates active servicemembers, ensuring 
good order and discipline within the military.253 This is the traditional courts-martial 
system, which Congress increasingly mirrors on the Article III system. It contains a 
three-tiered structure: courts-martial, the four courts of criminal appeals, and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the decisions of which are reviewable by the 
U.S. Supreme Court).254  
 
The system itself pre-dates the Constitution: in 1775, the Second Continental 
Congress passed 69 Articles of War, establishing courts-martial to adjudicate their 
violation.255 The rules drew extensively from the British Code of 1765 and the 
corresponding Massachusetts Bay requirements for its militia.256 A year later, Congress 
expanded the Articles.257 Further revisions occurred, the most notable of which being 
the shift in 1786 from requiring 13 members on general courts-martial to five, and five 
for special courts-martial to three.258 In 2016, the Military Justice Act expanded special 
 
249 David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
5, 17-18 (2005) (quoting from An Act for preventing Mutiny and Desertion § 4, Hening, supra note 248, 
at 88, and the Mutiny Act 1755, 28 Geo. 2 c. 4 (Eng.)). 
250 WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 22 & n.32. 
251 These courts are the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, Army Court of Criminal Appeals, Coast 
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces, Court of Military Commissions Review, Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims, and 
the ad hoc courts-martial and military commissions.  
252 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
253 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (“A court-martial. . . remains to a significant 
degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.”), overruled 
on other grounds by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). 
254 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166-69 (1994).  
255 See American Articles of War, art. XXXII, reprinted in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 349 n.15 
(1952); WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 47-48. See also id. at 953-59. 
256 WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 22 & n.32. 
257 JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., U.S. ARMY, THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE 2 (1959), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/background-UCMJ.pdf. 
258 Act of May 31, 1786, 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 1774-1789, at 317-22 
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904-37). See also WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 22-23. 
   29 
courts-martial to four members, general courts-martial to eight, and 12 members for 
capital cases.259 
 
Courts-martial were held with regularity during the Revolutionary War and early 
America.260 It was only natural that the Constitutional Convention went on to lodge the 
authority to constitute such laws and tribunals in Congress, empowering it “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and “[t]o 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such 
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”261 When the U.S. 
Constitution came into effect, the First Congress adopted the Articles of War of 1776 
to govern the Army.262 Soon thereafter, Congress passed a statute providing for 
governance of the Navy, which similarly provided for courts-martial.263 In recognition 
of the shift from the Articles of Confederation, in 1806 Congress formally enacted 101 
Articles of War, which remained in force for the next seven decades.264  
 
In 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that such tribunals are not subject to Article III 
requirements.265 To the contrary, the relevant provisions 
 
show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of 
military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized 
nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it 
and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United 
States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.266  
 
The Civil War prompted numerous changes to the code.267 In 1874, Congress codified 
the Articles of War.268 
 
In 1916, Congress re-enacted the Articles of War, vesting the military tribunals with 
the jurisdiction to try and to punish servicemembers for violations of both state and 
federal law.269 They subsequently underwent numerous revisions. The 1920 Articles of 
War, for instance, required the convening authority to appoint a defense counsel for 
both special and general courts (although it did not need to be an attorney).270 Starting 
in 1921, they were accompanied by a Manual for Courts-Martial, which detailed the 
 
259 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, sec. 5187, § 829, 130 Stat. 2894, 2903 (codified at 
10 U.S.C.A. § 829 (West)). 
260 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n.14 (1942) (listing nearly 20 instances of military tribunals being 
used, of which only the first two were not courts-martial).  
261 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 14, 16; Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2018). 
262 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96. 
263 See Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, art. 17, 2 Stat. 45, 47; id. art. 35, 2 Stat. at 50. 
264 Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359; JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 257, at 2-3. 
265 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). 
266 Id. 
267 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (giving courts martial during times of 
“war, insurrection, or rebellion” the authority to punish capital offences committed by members of the 
armed services). 
268 14 Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1875). 
269 Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 650. 
270 See Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, ch. II, 41 Stat. 759, 787. See also Act of July 9, 1918, ch. 143, ch. X, 
40 Stat. 845, 882 (amending arts. 52, 53, 57, 112); Act of Feb. 28, 1919, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 1211 (amending 
art. 50); Act of Nov. 19, 1919, ch. 112, 41 Stat. 356 (amending art. 112).  
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procedural rules. Further amendments were made in 1937 and 1942, and in 1947 they 
were made applicable to the Air Force.271  
 
With a significant number of civilians having been drafted into the military, calls 
for further changes resulted the following year in passage of the Elston Act, which, for 
the first time, authorized warrant officers and enlisted men to serve as members of both 
general and special courts-martial when the accused was enlisted.272 It strengthened the 
prohibitions on compulsory self-incrimination.273 In addition, it expanded the authority 
of the law member.274 The appellate bodies, in turn, were provided with broader 
authority to examine evidence, witnesses, and questions of fact.  
 
In 1950, largely in response to complaints from World War II servicemembers who 
went on to serve in public office, Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ),275 a comprehensive list of criminal offenses under military law and the 
operational rules that govern courts-martial. The purpose behind its adoption was to 
ensure a universal system for the armed forces, applicable during peacetime and war. 
Over the ensuing years, Congress made various amendments to the UCMJ, with the 
most sweeping changes following comprehensive examination of the UCMJ by the 
Military Justice Review Group 2014-2015. In 2016, Congress modernized the 
definitions for offenses, altered maximum penalties, created new offenses regarding 
computers and new technologies, standardized courts-martial, streamlined the post-trial 
process, and instituted other changes.276  
 
Courts-martial are not standing courts. Convening authorities constitute each one 
on an individual basis to address specific allegations against particular individuals. The 
system has evolved to be a bottoms-up process, with the express intent of freeing it from 
unlawful influence from above. Thus, while courts-martial technically may be 
convened by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the commander of a combatant 
command, in practice, they are convened by the senior commander of an installation—
typically a general or flag officer.277 The members of courts-martial panels normally are 
of the same rank or outrank the accused and are not “peers” in the sense of how that 
term applies to civilian juries.278 Military judges are subject to the military chain of 
command and do not have the protections of good behavior or compensation provided 
 
271 See Act of Aug. 20, 1937, ch. 716, 50 Stat. 724 (amending arts. 50½, 70); Act of Aug. 1, 1942, ch. 
542, 56 Stat. 732 (amending art. 50½); National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, §§ 207-208, 61 Stat. 495, 
502-04 (establishing the Air Force). 
272 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 203, art. 4, 62 Stat. 604, 628. 
273 Sec. 214, art. 24, 62 Stat. at 631. 
274 Sec. 206, art. 8, 62 Stat. at 629. Following World War I, the role of the law member had altered to 
ensure that the individual did not serve as both the prosecutor and advisor to the court. 
275 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946a (West)). One of the most significant changes was the shift in the role of the law 
member from a voting member of the panel to that of a law officer, in which capacity the individual 
served in a more judicial capacity. See JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 257, at 6. 
276 See Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894; See also 2018 
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No. 13,825, 3 C.F.R. 325 
(2019), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 801 (2018); Implementation of the Military Justice Act of 2016, Army 
Directive 2018-28 (Dec. 20, 2018),  
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18514_AD2018_28_w_Interim_r27_10_
FINAL.pdf. 
277 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 822-824.  
278 See id. § 825(e)(1). 
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to Article III courts.279 The military judge who presides over a general or special court-
martial is a commissioned officer as well as a member of the bar of the highest court of 
a State, and whom the Judge Advocate General certifies to qualify for duty.280  
 
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that alleged offences had to be connected to the 
defendant’s military service to be considered within military jurisdiction; however, in 
1989 the Court reversed its earlier decision, making the UCMJ broadly applicable.281 
To prosecute alleged violations, there are three types of courts-martial in each of the 
armed forces: general, special, and summary.282 The Manual for Courts-Martial 
establishes uniform rules of procedure that are similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.283 Decisions are reviewable by the relevant Court of Criminal Appeals, 
constituted by not less than three appellate military judges.284 The Court has jurisdiction 
over cases carrying the death penalty, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or 
midshipmen, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for 2 or more 
years; confinement 6 months to 2 years directly appealed by the defendant; and any case 
referred to the Court by the Judge Advocate General.285 There are currently four such 
courts in operation: the Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy-Marine Corps, and Army Courts 
of Criminal Appeals, each of which operates under its own procedures.286  
 
The final and highest court within the courts-martial structure is the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF).287 A court of record, it has five 
civilian judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
each serving 15-year terms.288 Judges are removable for neglect of duty, misconduct, or 
physical or mental disability.289 The Court has jurisdiction over cases in which the 
sentence as affirmed by any military Court of Criminal Appeals extends to death, any 
cases reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals which the Judge Advocate General 
orders sent to the Court, and by granting of petitions after review by the Court of 
 
279 See id. § 826; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1994). Although the U.S. Courts-Martial, 
like the Military Courts of Appeals, are neither courts of record nor explicitly established under Article I, 
the Supreme Court has stated that they are Article I courts. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 166-67, 168 (stating 
that the Military Courts of Criminal Appeals are Article I courts); id. at 166-67 (stating that the U.S. 
Courts-Martial are Article I courts). 
280 10 U.S.C.A. § 826(b). 
281 See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 
(1987). 
282 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 817 (jurisdiction in general); id. § 818 (general courts-martial); id. § 819 (special 
courts-martial); id. § 820 (summary courts-martial). 
283 Rules for Courts-Martial, in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES II-1 to II-206 (2019 ed.). 
The MCM is reviewed annually. 32 C.F.R. § 152.1 (2019). 
284 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 866, 862, 869, 864; 32 C.F.R. § 150.1 (2019). See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 
904, 912 (2009) (stating that Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) and Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) are Article I tribunals). Previously called the Military Courts of 
Review, in 1994 they were renamed to more clearly reflect the appellate judicial role of the tribunals. S. 
REP. NO. 103-282, at 230 (1994); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-701, at 737-38 (1994) (Conf. Rep.). 
285 See 32 C.F.R. § 150.2; 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 866(b), 869(d). 
286 32 C.F.R. § 150.1. See Courts of Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, 32 C.F.R. pt. 150; 
Joint Rules of Appellate Procedures for Courts of Criminal Appeals; United States Army Court of 
Criminal Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 
Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of 
Practice and Procedure; and, United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. 
287 10 U.S.C.A. § 941. 
288 Id. §§ 941, 942(a)-(b) 
289 Id. § 942(c). 
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Criminal Appeals.290 It maintains its own procedures,291 with its decisions reviewable 
by the Supreme Court.292 
 
2. Military Commissions: Articles I(8)(10) and (11) 
 
Unlike courts-martial, which are directed at ensuring discipline within the military, 
military commissions apply to non-soldiers: i.e., enemy combatants and civilians in 
times of war.293 Their purpose is to root out enemy spies, saboteurs, and provacateurs. 
As a constitutional matter, commissions derive from Congress’s authority “To declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water”; and its power “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed 
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”294 They thus carry with 
them an imprimateur of international law—particularly, provisions related to the laws 
of war. 
 
According to the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, the history of military 
commissions dates back to the Revolutionary War, when General George Washington 
constituted a military tribunal to try a British officer, Major John André, for 
espionage.295 The head of Britain’s Secret Service in America, André was caught while 
out of uniform, conspiring with Benedict Arnold.296 Military commissions were 
regularly convened during the Mexican-American War and Civil War.297 Similarly, 
military commissions were established during the Indian Wars, Philippine Insurrection, 
World War II, and post-9/11 military actions premised on the 2001 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force.298 
 
In 1866, the Supreme Court determined that the use of military tribunals for 
civilians, even during wartime, was unconstitutional as long as the civilian courts were 
 
290 Id. § 867(a). 
291 United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
292 10 U.S.C. § 867a. 
293 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 
U.S. 341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
294 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cls. 11, 10.  
295 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 & n.9 (citing Proceedings of a Board of General Officers Respecting Major 
John André, Sept. 29, 1780 (Francis Bailey ed., Philadelphia 1780), 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N13491.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext. But see  
Glazier, supra note 249, at 18-23 (arguing that the trial was an advisory opinion). Aside from André, 
Washington also brought Thomas Shanks before a Board of General Officers to avoid a formal trial. See 
id. at 22.  
296 Glazier, supra note 249, at 18. 
297 See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 n.10 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 241, at 832 n.66 (detailing 
numerous military commissions established in the course of the Mexican War); Dep’t of the Pac., Gen. 
Ord. No. 52 (June 27, 1865) (detailing the trial of T.E. Hogg and others during the Civil War by military 
commission for “violations of the laws and usages of civilized war”); Dep’t of the E., Gen. Ord. No. 14  
(Feb. 14, 1865) (trying John Y. Beall for “violation of the laws of war”); James Hamilton, Dep’t of the 
Ohio, Gen. Ord. No. 153 (Sept. 18, 1863) (trying soldiers and officers from the Confederate Army for 
“being secretly within the lines of the United States forces”)). See also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 
(1 Wall.) 243 (1863). 
298 See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 249249; Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise History, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 35 (2007); Peter R. Mansoor, Guantanamo and the History of Military Commissions, 
HOOVER INST. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/guantanamo-and-history-military-
commissions. 
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still in business.299 But where, as in Ex parte Quirin, Congress explicitly sanctions the 
use of military commissions for offenses against the law of war, they operate.300 Such 
was the determination of the Court again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, when it ruled that 
neither the Authorization for the Use of Military Force nor the Detainee Treatment Act 
expanded the President’s power to convene military commissions.301 The Court’s 
approach underscores that the authority to establish such courts relies not, narrowly, on 
Article II, but on Congress’s Article I powers—demanding a statutory framing to meet 
Constitutional requirements. In acting upon such authorization, the President further 
relies on Article II commander-in-chief authorities.302 
 
Military commissions are constituted by military officers and follow a different 
appellate structure than courts-martial. The currently-operable U.S. Court of Military 
Commission Review is a court of record consisting of one of more panels, each of which 
is composed of appellate military judges assigned by the Secretary of Defense or 
appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.303 The Court has 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from any military commission.304 It operates according to 
its own rules of procedure.305 Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia and, thence, to the Supreme Court.306 
 
3. Veterans Affairs: Article I(8)(14) and (16) 
 
The final military court in existence is the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims, which, like courts-martial, is a federal court of record established pursuant to 
Congress’s authority to make rules for the military. The court has exclusive jurisdiction 
to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals relating to veterans’ claims 
regarding benefits for service-related disabilities, survivor benefits, and other benefits 
owed to servicemembers (e.g., funding for higher education, or waivers of debt).307 Its 
decisions, in turn, are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.308 
The court is composed of at least three and not more than seven judges, appointed by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms of 15 years.309  
 
C. Federal Claims: Article I(8)(1) 
 
From the Founding of the United States until just before the Civil War, Congress 
received and decided private claims against the United States through its committee 
 
299 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
300 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. 
301 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593-94 (2006). 
302 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2561, PUB. PAPERS 296 (July 7, 1942) (citing both statutory law and the 
commander-in-chief provisions). 
303 10 U.S.C.A. § 950f (West); see also In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that the 
Military Commissions Act of 2009 established an Article I court of record). Note, however, that the 
Court in Hamdan, discussing the interplay of Article I(8)(10), (11), (12), (14), and Article II did not 
definitively rule on whether the President could constitutionally convene a military commission without 
sanction by Congress under the Commander-in-Chief authority, augmented by the Law of War. See 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591. 
304 10 U.S.C.A. § 950c. 
305 United States Court of Military Commission Review Rules of Practice. 
306 10 U.S.C.A. § 950g(a), (e). 
307 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252. 
308 Id. § 7292. 
309 38 U.S.C.A. § 7253; see also id. §7251. 
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system and congressional entities, followed by private appropriations bills subject to 
bicameralism and presentment. Addressing such concerns was part and parcel of the 
political process. But the number of petitions rapidly grew: by 1838, the volume had 
increased sixfold over those presented to the First Congress, making it impossible to 
consider, much less dispose of, most grievances.310 As one scholar opined, “[b]y 1848, 
the dissatisfaction had turned to crisis. For the first time, the legitimacy of the 
‘legislative model’ [of redressing grievances] came under widespread political 
attack.”311 With only one out of every 18 claimants petitions successfully passing the 
House and Senate,312 the system was no longer merely expensive—it was unjust.  
 
Accordingly, in 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to hear certain matters, 
while still retaining control over both the expenditure of all public money and the 
authority to continue to hear individual grievances.313 Its role was to determine certain 
claims against the federal government as well as claims referred by Congress.314 The 
statute required the court to report back to Congress, which decided whether it would 
pay the recommended judgment out of the public funds. Congress provided for the three 
jurists to be appointed and to serve in office in a manner that echoed Article III: 
nomination by the President, confirmation by the Senate, and tenure during good 
behavior.315 The constitutional nexus for the creation of the tribunal was found in 
Congress’s control over the power to pay the debts of the United States, as encapsulated 
in Article I(8)(1), in concert with the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
 
The structure failed to address the underlying problem. The number of unaddressed 
grievances continued to increase.316 Further augmented by a flood of Civil War claims, 
matters came to a head. In 1863, Congress therefore gave the court the power to issue 
its own decisions, instead of merely reporting its determinations to the legislature.317 
The statute still required the Secretary of the Treasury to review the decisions and to 
estimate the appropriation prior to any disbursement of funds.318  
 
Two years later, in Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction 
over appeals from the court.319 No formal opinion accompanied the denial. Upon 
becoming Chief Justice, though, Salmon P. Chase published one attributing it to the 
provision according Treasury the power of review.320 It was within Congress’s power 
to establish an entity to examine testimony and to determine the validity of claims. The 
problem was trying to insert the Supreme Court into the process. The prospect of its 
opinions being regulated by the executive or legislative branches raised separation of 
powers concerns. In 1792, five of the six Supreme Court justices had rejected a similar 
legislative structure in Hayburn’s Case—a point underscored the following year in 
 
310 See H.R. Rep. No. 25-730, at 4, 8-9 (1838). 
311 Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a 
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 649 (1985). 
312 See id.  
313 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. 
314 Id. § 1, 10 Stat. at 612. 
315 Id. 
316 Shimomura, supra note 311, at 653. 
317 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 765. 
318 Id. § 14, 12 Stat. 768. 
319 Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). 
320 Gordon v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 1 (1871). Twenty-one year’s after Chief Justice Taney’s death, a 
draft opinion by him also emerged, linking the Court’s denial of jurisdiction to the requirement that the 
Court’s ruling be final and enforceable. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864). 
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Chisolm v. Georgia when it determined that the Court could hear claims against states, 
with their decision final (thus prompting the 11th Amendment).321 
 
Within a year of the Court’s refusal of jurisdiction in Gordon v. United States, 
Congress struck the offending provision from the statute.322 Thereafter, the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear appeals from the Court of Claims.323 In 1886, the Court held that 
“as the law now stands, appeals do lie to this court from the judgments of the court of 
claims, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.”324 In 1887, Congress passed 
legislation expanding the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction to all claims except tort 
and restricting what could go to Congress, making the court the primary venue for 
monetary claims against the United States.325 
 
Throughout this time, the court operated as an Article I(8) entity. In Williams v. 
United States, it noted that what started as an administrative or advisory body had 
evolved into a court exercising judicial power and capable of rendering final judgements 
reviewable by the Supreme Court.326 There was no constitutional tension in maintaining 
two parallel systems, with final appeal lodged in Article III: while Article III(2)(1) 
extends the judicial power to “all” cases relating to certain areas, it omitted the word in 
regard to controversies to which the United States shall be a party. This meant that cases 
could start in Article I(8)(9) tribunals. 
 
As Congress became more focused on matters of national and international concern 
in the mid-20th century, the federal judiciary assumed the responsibility of determining 
virtually all claims against the United States.327 Then, in 1953, as discussed in Part 
II(B)(5), Congress declared the U.S. Court of Claims to be an Article III court.328 Six 
years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s status.329 In 1982, however, 
Congress turned the tribunal back into an Article I Court.330 Currently, it thus operates 
as an Article I court, subject to review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (itself an Article III court).331 
 
321 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (five of the six Justices declining to hear the 
claims and questioning the constitutionality of the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 
whereby disabled veterans could apply for pensions to the U.S. Circuit Courts, with their decisions 
subject to a stay by the Secretary of War pending further Congressional action); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Art. III(2) abrogated state sovereign immunity and provided for 
the justiciability of suits between private citizens and states), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
While the latter case is most often understood as a matter of state versus federal power, Federalists at the 
time were also concerned about its implications for transferring the responsibility for the allocation of 
federal monies to the judiciary. See Shimomura, supra note 311, at 642-43. 
322 Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9. 
323 See De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)  419 (1866); United States v. Alire, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
577 (1867) (mem.); United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874); Langford v. United States, 
101 U.S. 341 (1879). 
324 United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 480 (1886). 
325 See Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. 
326 See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 567-68, 581 (1933). 
327 The claims court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States. See 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a), 1491(b)(1) (West) (conferring concurrent jurisdiction on district courts and the 
court of claims for certain actions). 
328 Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-158, 67 Stat. 226. 
329 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-71 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). 
330 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 105, § 171, 96 Stat. 25, 27 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 171). 
331 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 171(a), 1295(a)(3); see also Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-572, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (assigning the name “United States Court of Federal Claims”). 
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D. Taxes and Customs: Article I(8)(1) 
 
Other legislative courts stem from so-called public rights, such as those related to 
taxes, customs, and administration of public lands. The public rights distinction was 
first identified by the Supreme Court in 1855. The Court explained, 
 
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such 
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are 
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. 
Equitable claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking 
instance of such a class of cases.332  
 
The U.S. Tax Court has nineteen members, appointed to 15-year terms by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.333 The court has limited subject matter 
jurisdiction: it may only consider cases related to taxation.334 
 
E. Bankruptcy: Article I(8)(4) 
 
Although the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority to establish 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,”335 for 
much of the country’s history, Congress did not vest federal courts with jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy. Three short-lived statutes marked the 19th century. In 1800, facing an 
economic downturn, Congress defined what would constitute an act of bankruptcy and 
provided for district court judges to appoint commissioners to oversee the discharge of 
debts in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.336 Congress repealed the act in 1803.337 
Nearly 40 years later, again facing an economic depression, Congress enacted a statute 
that was to last only two years, during which time district courts held jurisdiction over 
“all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”338 In 1867, Congress again waded into the 
water, granting district courts original jurisdiction over bankruptcy, abandoning the 
effort in 1878.339  
 
It was not until 1898 that Congress was able to enact a lasting measure, at which 
time it established referees, to be appointed by district judges, to oversee bankruptcy 
cases and to exercise limited judicial responsibilities for matters referred by the district 
court. 340 Subsequent amendments expanded the power accorded to the referees.341 As 
 
332 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). 
333 26 U.S.C.A. § 7443. 
334 See id. § 7442. 
335 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
336 See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1-2, Stat. 19, 19-22.  
337 Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1999) (positing that the enactment and repeal of the 1800 
act was in part due to a power struggle between Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats). 
338 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 
614). 
339 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517 (repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 
99). 
340 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33-34, 38-39, 30 Stat. 544, 555, 555-56.  
341 See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, sec. 2, § 34, 60 Stat. 
323, 324.  
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the district courts became increasingly congested, as part of a broader reform effort, the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Congress,342 
recommended that a separate set of subject-specific federal courts be created.343 The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 gave original jurisdiction for bankruptcy to the district 
courts, creating a separate, adjunct court in each judicial district to exercise the 
jurisdiction.344 The judges were to be appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate, with a term of office set at 14 years.345  
 
In 1982, the Supreme Court declared the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to courts 
constituted by judges without life tenure to be unconstitutional.346 Congress responded 
by passing a new statute that conferred jurisdiction on the district courts and authorizing 
them to refer all matters within that jurisdiction to the bankruptcy judges for the 
district.347 The statute also changed the manner of appointment, giving the Courts of 
Appeals the power to appoint judges.348 
 
Additional amendments in 1986, 2004, and 2005 further shaped the structure.349 
Currently, bankruptcy courts exist as a unit of the district court in which they reside.350 
Judges are appointed by the courts of appeals of the circuit in which they are located 
for a term of 14 years.351 Reflecting the need for a dedicated court to relieve the district 
courts of the burden, there are currently 316 bankruptcy judges in the United States.352 
The salary is set at 92 percent of a district court judge.353 They can be removed “only 
for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability and only 
by the judicial council of the circuit in which the judge’s official duty station is 
located.”354 Each district court may provide that any or all cases under Title 11 be 
assigned to a bankruptcy court.355 
 
The decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy courts are reviewable by the U.S. district 
courts or, where applicable, by a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.356 Such panels are 
 
342 Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. 
343 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 6 (1973). 
344 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 201, 241, §§ 151, 1471, 92 Stat. 2549, 
2657, 2668. 
345 Sec. 201, § 153, 92 Stat. at 2657. 
346 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-62, 87 (1982), superseded by 
statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
347 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act sec. 104, § 157, 98 Stat. 333, 340 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West)). 
348 Sec. 104, § 152, 98 Stat. at 336 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 152). 
349 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-304, 108 Stat. 4106; 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
350 28 U.S.C.A. § 151. 
351 Id. § 152(a)(1). 
352 See id. § 152(a)(2). 
353 Id. § 153. 
354 Id. § 152(e). 
355 Id. § 157(a). 
356 Id. § 158. Note that not all circuits have Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs). See Court Insider: 
What Is a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012/11/26/court-
insider-what-bankruptcy-appellate-panel (Dec. 5, 2012).  The rules of the First Circuit, Sixth Circuit, 
Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit panels differ. 
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composed of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals.357 Their decisions are reviewable by 
the relevant circuit court of appeals.358 
 
F. Citizenship: Article I(8)(4) 
 
The Choctaw and Chikasaw Citizenship Court, created by Congress in 1902, also 
operated as an Article I court.359 It came out of a series of statutes passed in the late 19th 
century that focused on dividing and allocating land among the Cherokee, Chickasaw, 
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.360 An act of Congress in 1893 established a 
commission to negotiate the agreement.361 Named after its chair, Senator Henry Dawes 
of Massachusetts, the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes (Dawes Commission) 
accepted or rejected applicants for membership in the tribes based on whether the tribal 
government had previously acknowledged their membership.362 It distinguished among 
applicants as citizens by blood, citizens by marriage, minor citizens by blood, new born 
citizens by blood, freedmen (formerly enslaved African Americans) new born 
freedmen, and minor freedmen.363  
 
Those who were unsuccessful at obtaining citizenship could appeal to the U.S. 
Court for the Indian Territory, which in some cases granted the appeal without notice 
to the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.364 The nations objected, prompting Congress in 
1902 to reach an accord with them whereby it created an Article I court.365 The President 
appointed a chief judge and two associate judges, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.366 
 
The statute authorized the tribes to file a suit in this court, with ten named 
defendants standing as those who had been admitted without notice.367 The law granted 
the court appellate jurisdiction for citizenship determinations as reached by the U.S. 
court in the Indian territory.368 The agreement also conferred “[e]xclusive jurisdiction 
upon the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes to determine, under the direction of 
the Secretary of the Interior, all matters relating to the allotment of land.”369 The court, 
by agreement, was to terminate upon a final determination of the citizenship question, 
but no later than the end of 1903—a deadline that Congress subsequently extended to 
 
357 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(1). 
358 Id. § 158(d). 
359 Act of July 21, 1902, ch. 1362, § 33, 32 Stat. 641, 648. 
360 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412, 25 Stat. 980; Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612; Act of 
June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495; Act of May 31, 1900, ch. 598, 31 Stat. 221. 
361 Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. at 645. 
362 Dawes Records: Five Civilized Tribes—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole Tribes 
in Oklahoma, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/native-
americans/dawes?_ga=2.11424372.1336762792.1603825750-746858546.1602531796 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2020). 
363 Id. 
364 Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, 1902-1904, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/choctaw-and-chickasaw-citizenship-court-1902-1904 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2020). 
365 See Act of July 21, 1902, ch. 1362, § 33, 32 Stat. 641, 648. 
366 Id.  
367 Id. § 31, 32 Stat. at 646-47. 
368 Id. § 31, 32 Stat. at 647. 
369 Id. § 24, 32 Stat. at 644. 
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the end of the following year.370 The court only operated less than seven months after 
reaching a final determination in just one case.371 
IV. TERRITORIAL COURTS: ARTICLE IV(3) 
 
In 1781, the Articles of Confederation gave the national government (in Congress 
assembled) the power to determine admission to the union.372 Three years later, the 
Treaty of Paris brought a formal end to the Revolutionary War, ceding not just the 
thirteen colonies (at that point, nascent states), but most of Britain’s possessions east of 
the Mississippi River. The Northwest Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787 reconstituted 
this land as Northwest Territory, provided for its governance, and outlined the process 
for state admission. By the time the Constitution was adopted, it was thus clear that 
explicit authority had to be provided to govern such territories. Accordingly, Article 
IV(3), gives Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”373  
 
As a constitutional matter, therefore, Congress possesses and exercises absolute 
control over U.S. territories.374 In 1828, the question of the status of courts in the 
territories came before the Supreme Court. As Part III of this Article noted, in this case 
Marshall pinpointed the constitutional locus as Article IV, as well as the sovereign 
authority of the United States.375 Just over two decades later, the Court again returned 
to the status of the governance structure in the territories: 
 
 
They are legislative governments, and their courts legislative courts, Congress, 
in the exercise of its powers in the organization and government of the 
Territories, combining the powers of both the Federal and State authorities. 
There is but one system of government, or of laws operating within their limits, 
as neither is subject to the constitutional provisions in respect to State and 
Federal jurisdiction. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject 
to its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law; 
but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department, and subject to 
its supervision and control.376 
 
While it is true that Congress brings such entities into being, they are not Article I courts 
in a constitutional sense.377 
 
Failure to acknowledge this aspect of territorial government has led to much 
confusion, not least in determining to what extent other Constitutional provisions apply 
to the territories. In the Insular Tariff Cases that marked the end of the 19th and early 
20th centuries, the Supreme Court wrestled with how to understand governance of 
noncontiguous territory. In one of the most prominent, Downes v. Bidwell, it concluded 
 
370 Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, supra note 364. 
371 Id. 
372 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XI (requiring the admission into the Union be agreed 
to by nine states). 
373 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
374 See Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-337 (1810). 
375 See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
376 Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242. 
377 When territorial courts are addressed in the scholarship, they are frequently (and erroneously) 
described as Article I courts. See, e.g., REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 7. 
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that a tariff imposed on goods imported from Puerto Rico did not violate Article I 
constitutional provisions requiring uniform duties, imposts, and excises.378 Similarly, in 
Dooley v. United States, the Court upheld the Foraker Act, requiring all merchandise to 
Puerto Rico from the United States to carry a duty—despite the constitutional provision 
in Article I forbidding any tax or duty on articles exported from any state.379 No clear 
rationale dominated the Court’s determination. Gradually, through the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation (which stemmed from Justice Edward White’s concurrence in 
Downes), the application of Constitutional provisions became understood in terms of 
whether the territories in question had become “incorporated into the union.”380 
 
In its exercise of is power over the myriad territories acquired by the United States, 
Congress has created at least four dozen separate territorial judicial systems. Every 
single one of the attendant courts is a non-Article III (and non-Article I) entity.381 
Consistent with the doctrine, we divide these tribunals into two categories: incorporated 
and unincorporated territorial courts. 
 
A. Incorporated 
 
Outside of the original 13 states, as well as Kentucky, Vermont, Texas, California, 
and West Virginia, every state in the continental U.S. came within an incorporated 
territory prior to admission.382 In total, some thirty-one territories (or parts thereof) 
eventually became states. In each case, Congress created superior and inferior federal 
courts to execute territorial judicial power and to administer the law.383 The federal 
legislature also determined which legal system would be administered. Where Congress 
could not decide (for example, whether English, Canadian, Spanish, or Mexican rules 
should apply), it provided territorial courts with jurisdiction over “criminal” and “civil” 
cases and ensured that the pre-existing law would remain in force, to the extent that it 
was compatible with the U.S. Constitution.384 Where Congress intended for the 
adoption of the English system of law, in some cases it explicitly provided for superior 
 
378 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
379 Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
380 Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). 
381 See, e.g., id.; Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-337 (1810); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 656 (1873); Good v. Martin, 
95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); City of Panama, 101 U.S. 
453, 460 (1879); McAllister v. United Sates, 141 U.S. 174, 184 (1891); see also Romeu v. Todd, 206 
U.S. 358, 368 (1907) (“The district court of the United States for Porto Rico is in no sense a 
constitutional court of the United States, and its authority emanates wholly from Congress under the 
sanction of the power possessed by that body to govern territory occupying the relation to the United 
States which Porto Rico does.”)  
382 William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the 
Development of American Legal Institutions (pt. 2), 61 MICH. L. REV. 467, 467 (1963). In 1912 the last 
state in the continental United States was admitted to the Union. Id. 
383 See, e.g., Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88. For an excellent summary of 
courts established in the territories prior to 1836, see William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, 
Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions (pt. 1), 
61 MICH. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (1962). 
384 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 518. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1805 ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322, 322 
(giving inhabitants of the Orleans Territory “all the rights, privileges, and advantages secured by” the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 743, 747 (guaranteeing that 
judicial proceedings in the Missouri Territory would be conducted “according to the common law and the 
laws and usages in force in the said territory”). 
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judges to be granted common law jurisdiction.385 In others, it established that 
inhabitants were “entitled” to judicial proceedings consistent with common law.386 At 
times Congress gave superior judges both chancery and common law jurisdiction.387 In 
one case (Alaska), Congress indicated that “The common law of England as adopted 
and understood in the United States” would be in force.388  
 
Despite such direction, considerable questions remained about what, precisely, 
constituted common law—an issue addressed by subsequent territorial case law and 
statutory provisions.389 Some looked to the common law of England and statutes that 
supported it prior to 1607 (the rule of decision). Others considered the law as it existed 
in 1776; still others looked to select British statutes.390 In all cases, the laws and system 
of rules adopted had to be compatible with the U.S. Constitution.391 Congress also 
granted territorial courts jurisdiction over other matters, such as probate (wills and 
conveyances of land); divorce; admiralty; and bankruptcy.392 The rules of procedure 
varied. In 1800, for instance, the General Assembly of Northwest required judges of the 
General Court “to compile a system of rules for the government of the general and 
circuit courts.”393 In other regions, the highest court in the territory established the 
equivalent rules.394 Although the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 1863 that a 
 
385 See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (conferring common law jurisdiction on 
the superior judges and ensuring that inhabitants should “always be entitled to the benefits of . . . judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law”); Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 549, 
550 (guaranteeing the people of Mississippi “the rights, privileges and advantages” granted by the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 58, 59 (conferring common law 
jurisdiction on Indiana courts through incorporation of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of Jan. 11, 
1805, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309, 309 (conferring common law jurisdiction on the Michigan Territory through 
incorporation by reference of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787). 
386 See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (conferring common law jurisdiction on 
the superior judges and ensuring that inhabitants should “always be entitled to the benefits of . . . judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law.”); Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 10, 
15 (entitling inhabitants of the Wisconsin Territory benefits granted and secured in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 323, 329 (entitling inhabitants of the 
Oregon Territory to the “rights, privileges, and advantages granted and secured” by the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787). 
387 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455 (Utah); Act of Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 90, § 9, 10 
Stat. 172, 1776 (Washington); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, §§ 9, 27, 10 Stat. 277, 280, 286 (Nebraska 
and Kansas); Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (Colorado); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83, 
§ 9, 12 Stat. 209, 212 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 239, 242 (Dakota); Act of Mar. 
3, 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 808, 811 (Idaho); Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88 
(Montana); Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 178, 181 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 
182, § 9, 26 Stat. 81, 85 (Oklahoma). 
388 Alaska Criminal Code, ch. 429, 30 Stat. 1253, 1285 (1899). See also Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 7, 
23 Stat. 24, 25 (1884) (general laws of Oregon declared to be enforce within the Alaska judicial district). 
389 See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 652, 656-57 (1873) (ruling on the 
intermingling of legal and equitable remedies under common law). For a thoughtful discussion of the 
integration of law into the territories, see William Wirt Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier: 
Adoption of Laws by Governor and Judges—Northwest Territory 1788-1798; Indiana Territory 1800-
1804; Michigan Territory 1805-1823, 60 MICH. L. REV. 317 (1962). 
390 See generally Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 477-523; Blume, supra note 389, at 333-48. 
391 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 2935, at 523 (1887); Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, tit. III, § 367, 31 Stat. 
321, 494, 552 (1900); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 510, 514 (quoting the aforementioned 
statutes). 
392 Blume & Brown, supra note 383, at 59-71. 
393 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 475 (quoting 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN 
TERRITORY ch. 141, § 9, at 307 (Salmon P. Chase ed., Cincinnati, Corey & Fairbank 1833)). 
394 See id. (referencing A DIGEST OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 
(Detroit, Sheldon & Reed 1821)). 
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territorial court sitting in chancery was governed by the same rules governing Article 
III entities, in 1874 the Court reversed course.395  
 
With the exception of some early judges, for whom Congress guaranteed office 
during good behavior, territorial judges were appointed for limited terms and removable 
by the President at will.396 For the territorial governments constructed along the lines of 
the Northwest Ordinance, at least three judges appointed by the President constituted 
the highest court in each territory, with jurisdiction over both state-type and federal-
type cases.397 After 1836, Congress largely standardized its approach.398 In cases 
concerning the United States (and later, cases involving certain amounts), federal law 
provided for appeal to Article III courts.399 The U.S. Supreme Court generally acted as 
the highest court of appeal.400 
 
Once statehood was achieved, territorial courts ceased operating and were replaced 
by Article III entities. But as long as the territory itself was the dominant government, 
there was no question: the courts did not constitute the judicial branch of the federal 
government.401 One way, therefore, to think about territorial courts collectively is as 
“coextensive with and correspondent to [the jurisdiction] of the State courts”—i.e., an 
entirely “different jurisdiction from that exercised by the Circuit and District Courts of 
the United States.”402 Since 1959, there have not been any incorporated (organized) 
territories.403 
 
 
395 Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73, 77 (1863), overruled by Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 648, 652-53 (1873). 
396 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 5, 2 Stat. 283, 284 (Orleans); Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 
10, 2 Stat. 743, 746 (Missouri); Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 7, 3 Stat. 493, 495 (Arkansaw); Act of 
Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 8, 3 Stat. 654, 657 (Florida); Act of June 12, 1838, ch. 96, § 9, 5 Stat. 235, 237-
38 (Iowa); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 9, 9 Stat. 323, 326 (Oregon ); Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 121, § 
9, 9 Stat. 403, 406 (Minnesota); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 10, 9 Stat. 446, 449 (New Mexico); Act of 
Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455 (Utah); Act of Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 90, § 9, 10 Stat. 172, 175 
(Washington); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 277, 280 (Nebraska); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 
59, § 279, 10 Stat. 277, 286 (Kansas); Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (Colorado); Act 
of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83, § 9, 12 Stat. 209, 212 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 239, 
241 (Dakota); Act of Feb. 24, 1863, ch. 56, § 2, 12 Stat. 664, 665 (Arizona); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 
117, § 9, 12 Stat. 808, 811 (Idaho); Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88 (Montana); Act of 
July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 178, 180-81 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 9, 26 Stat. 
81, 85 (Oklahoma). See also McAllister v. United Sates, 141 U.S. 174, 185 nn.1-2 (1891) (citing to these 
acts); Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 468; Blume & Brown, supra note 383, at 47. 
397 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 477. 
398 See Blume & Brown, supra note 383, at 49-51. 
399 Blume & Brown, supra note 382, at 477. There are no published reports of early territorial cases. See 
id. at 477 n.70. 
400 See, e.g., Orchard, 68 U.S. 73 (on appeal from the Territorial Court of Nebraska). 
401 See, e.g., City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879);  McAllister v. United Sates, 141 U.S. 174, 184 
(1891); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1871) . 
402 Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 656 (1873). See also Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
235, 244 (1850). 
403 There is currently one incorporated (unorganized) territory: the Palmyra Atoll, a national wildlife 
refuge of approximately 50 islands owned by the Nature Conservancy and administered by U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service. One of the largest marine conservation areas globally, the archipelago features pristine 
coral reefs, thermal vents, and the Masked Booby. See Definitions of Insular Area Political 
Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/politicatypes (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2021) (listed under definitions for incorporate territory and Territory); Palmyra Atoll, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/refuge/palmyra_atoll/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021). 
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B. Unincorporated 
 
Unincorporated territories describe regions where the U.S. Constitution has not 
been fully incorporated. While fundamental rights are guaranteed, other provisions are 
inapplicable. The Panama Canal provides a special case in that the tribunal established 
there grew out of a statutorily-based territorial governance structure but was eventually 
incorporated into the Fifth Circuit. It thus more closely resembles the current territorial 
courts in existence, of which there are three. 
 
The Panama Canal Zone provided a home for one of the first unincorporated territorial 
courts. The 1902 Spooner Act authorized the President to purchase the rights and 
property of the (French) New Panama Canal Company and to secure “perpetual control 
of a strip of land, the territory of the Republic of Colombia, not less than six miles in 
width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean” and the right to build a 
canal and to maintain and operate the Panama Railroad in perpetuity.404 Should 
Columbia not concede, the President was to negotiate the same from Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua.405  The statute created an Isthmian Canal Commission, with seven members 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to govern the 
region and oversee construction of the canal, “subject to the direction and control of the 
President.”406 Although the Senate ratified the treaty, the Colombian congress rejected 
it.407  
 
When the Republic of Panama declared its independence in 1903, the U.S. landed 
marines and informed Colombia that it would not allow trade to be jeopardized.408 It 
recognized the new government and drafted a new treaty which, in return for 
guaranteeing Panama’s independence, conveyed a ten miles wide zone to the sovereign 
control of the United States.409 It further granted a monopoly in perpetuity for canals 
and railways across the territory. Both governments ratified the agreement. General W. 
Davis, the first governor, appointed a judge to exercise judicial authority.410 
 
For its first decade or so, governance was under direct control of the President. In 
1912, however, Congress assumed more direct control, establishing civil government 
and directing that the current laws would remain in effect only until Congress should 
provide otherwise.411 It recognized “[t]he existing courts established in the Canal Zone 
by Executive order” and continued them in operation until the courts provided for in 
the statute were established.412 It also established a District Court for the Canal Zone, 
with decisions appealable to the Fifth Circuit.413 In 1914, by authorities vested in this 
Act, President Woodrow Wilson issued an Executive Order abolishing the prior 
structure and, consistent with legislative provisions directed at wartime, placed the 
canal under the control of the Secretary of War.414 Two months later, he issued a second 
 
404 Panama Canal Act of 1902, ch. 1302, §§ 1-2, 32 Stat. 481, 481. 
405 Id. § 4, 32 Stat. at 482. 
406 Id. § 7, 32 Stat. at 483. 
407 THOMAS, supra note 6, at 315. 
408 Id. at 315-16. 
409 Id. at 317. 
410 Id. at 317-18. 
411 Panama Canal Act 1912, ch. 390, § 2, 37 Stat. 560, 561. 
412 Id. 
413 Id. § 8-9, 37 Stat. at 565-66. 
414 Exec. Order No. 1885 (Jan. 27, 1914), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-
1885-establish-permanent-organization-for-the-operation-and-government-the. 
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Executive Order formally establishing the U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone.415 
Replacing the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone, the District Court had original and 
appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. In 1933, the court transferred to 
the U.S. Department of Justice.416 The court thereafter operated until the return of the 
zone to Panama in 1982.417 
 
Cuba, Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, and Palau provide further examples of former U.S. territories that have 
since become independent. Currently, there are thirteen insular (unincorporated) areas, 
only five of which (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto 
Rico, and American Samoa) are inhabited, and only three of which have territorial 
courts.418  
 
Guam, one of the Mariana Islands, was ceded by Spain to the United States in 
1899.419 In 1950, Congress passed a statute giving the protectorate a significant amount 
of local autonomy.420 The District Court of Guam has the same jurisdiction of a regular 
federal District Court (including, but not limited to, diversity jurisdiction), as well as 
that of a bankruptcy court.421 The District Court of Guam has original jurisdiction in all 
other causes in Guam to the extent that the legislature has not vested it in another 
court.422 Decisions are reviewable by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.423 Judges, 
appointed by the President to ten year terms, are removable for cause and accorded a 
salary commensurate with that of a district court judge.424 The court supplements the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with Civil Local Rules of Practice (CVLR). 
 
The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands is part of the same judicial 
circuit as Guam.425 Granted a similar scope for its jurisdiction, the court is made up of 
just one judge, appointed by the President for a ten-year term.426 Like the District Court 
of Guam, appeal is to the Ninth Circuit.427 Both the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit 
and the Chief Justice may assign additional, temporary judges to the court.428  
 
 
415 Exec. Order No. 1898 (Mar. 12, 1914), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_1898. 
416 Exec. Order No. 6166, § 6 (June 10, 1933) (transferring the U.S. Court for China, the District Court of 
the United States for the Panama Canal Zone, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands to the 
Department of Justice), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-
order/06166.html.  
417 Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-70, §§ 2101, 2201, 93 Stat. 452, 493. 
418 See Definitions of Insular Area Political Organizations, supra note 403; The Territories: They Are Us, 
ST. LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2018, at 27. 
419 Treaty of Paris, Spain-U.S., art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755. See also 48 U.S.C.A. 1421 
(West) (defining the territory of Guam). 
420 See Organic Act of Guam, ch. 512, § 11, 64 Stat. 384, 387 (1950) (codified as amended at 48 
U.S.C.A. § 1423a) (extending authority “to all subjects of legislation of local application”). 
421 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424(b). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (related diversity jurisdiction provisions). 
422 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424(c). Congress also designated a local appellate court, the Supreme Court of Guam, 
and trial court, the Superior Court of Guam. Id. § 1424(a)(1). The Supreme Court of Guam has the power 
to create divisions of the Superior Court of Guam as well as other local courts. Id.§ 1424(a)(2)-(3). 
423 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1294(4). See also 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-3 (appeal from the appellate division). 
424 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424b(a). 
425 Id. § 1821(a). 
426 Id. §§ 1821(b)(1) (appointment), 1822 (jurisdiction). 
427 Id. §§ 1801 note (indicating that the Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 403(b), 90 Stat. 263, 
267 provides that portions of Title 28 that apply to the District Court of Guam are applicable to the 
District Court for the Mariana Islands). See also id. § 1823 (appeal from the appellate division). 
428 Id. §§ 1821(b)(2). 
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Congress similarly vested the judicial power of the Virgin Islands in a district court 
and such appellate and lower courts as are created by local law.429 The local legislature 
has the authority to grant them jurisdiction over any matters in which the federal courts 
lack exclusive jurisdiction.430 Congress explicitly provided the court with diversity 
jurisdiction as well as that of a bankruptcy court in the United States, and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands in regard to the 
applicable income tax laws.431 The district court has concurrent jurisdiction with local 
courts over criminal offences.432 Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit.433 The President appoints two judges to the court for 10 
year terms, the longer serving of whom serves as chief judge of the court.434 The salary 
rate is set to that of a district court judge.435 In the event that the case load becomes 
untenable, the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit may assign a circuit judge or a 
recalled senior judge from the islands to temporarily serve on the court.436 
 
Although Congress previously created a territorial court for Puerto Rico, its status 
has now shifted to that of an Article III entity. In its initial design, the court had one 
judge in office for a four-year term.437 In 1915, Congress provided for appeals from the 
court to go to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.438 Nevertheless, as recognized by the 
Supreme Court shortly thereafter, the Court continued to function in its Article IV 
status:  
 
created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article 
4, § 3 [of the Constitution], of making all needful rules and regulations 
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its 
jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to 
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not 
change its character as a mere territorial court.439 
 
In 1938, Congress doubled judges’ length of tenure on the court to eight years.440 In 
1966, Congress re-constituted it as a full Article III entity, with now seven judges 
granted life tenure during good behavior.441 
 
 
429 Id. § 1611(a). 
430 Id. § 1611(b). 
431 Id. § 1612(a). 
432 Id. § 1612(c). 
433 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1294(3); see also 48 U.S.C.A. § 1613a (appeal from the appellate division). 
434 48 U.S.C.A. § 1614(a). 
435 Id. 
436 Id. 
437 Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84. 
438 Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 1-2, 38 Stat. 803, 803. 
439 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922). 
440 Act of Mar. 26, 1938, ch. 51, 52 Stat. 118, 118. 
441 Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764, provided judges with lifetime tenure, thus 
reconstituting the court as an Article III District Court. For the statutes establishing the judgeships, see § 
34, 31 Stat. at 84 (creating one judgeship); Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, § 2, 75 Stat. 80, 81 
(adding one judgeship); Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat. 294, 294 (adding one 
judgeship); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629, 1629-30 (adding four judgeships). 
See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 133. 
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The final unincorporated inhabited territory, American Samoa, does not have a 
federal court. Matters related to federal law instead go to U.S. district courts in Hawaii 
or the District of Columbia. 442  
V. TREATY-BASED COURTS: ARTICLES II(2)/I(8)(3) HYBRIDS 
 
Another category of federal court finds its origins in Article II, which grants the 
executive the authority “to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur” and to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”443 The 
power to negotiate is construed broadly and reflects long-established diplomatic 
practice—including providing for the establishment of federal courts overseas. As the 
Supreme Court explained in the 19th century, “[t]he treaty-making power vested in our 
government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments. It 
can, equally with any of the former or present governments of Europe, make treaties 
providing for the exercise of judicial authority in other countries by its officers 
appointed to reside therein.”444 Accordingly, citizens’ rights overseas, and the extent to 
which foreign nationals’ domestic law is applied through such courts, are set by formal 
international agreement. So, too, are tribunals related to citizens’ rights outside the 
United States when set against those of other countries. 
 
Treaties are necessary but not sufficient for establishing extraterritorial courts. They 
depend equally upon foreign nationals’ domestic law for the relevant tribunal to be 
brought into existence.445 In the U.S. context, all such treaties would have to be 
supported by Congressional statute.446 While the status of self-executing versus non-
self-executing treaties is a complex area of the law, a central consideration is whether 
Congress needs to create legal authority for carrying out the functions and obligations 
in the agreement or making them enforceable in a U.S. court.447 Consular courts, as well 
as tribunals related to slavery and international land claims, fall within this category. 
 
A. Consular Courts 
 
From the earliest days of the Republic, it has been understood that when a treaty 
addresses an area constitutionally assigned to Congress, it cannot be used to bypass the 
legislature.448 Thus, lower courts have found that treaty provisions which implicate 
revenue or expenditures require legislative action to be given effect.449 In 1929, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Congress, in creating consular courts, was acting under its 
commerce clause authorities.450 It had done so since the early days of the Republic. 
 
442 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-1124T, AMERICAN SAMOA: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH 
SOME FEDERAL COURT OPTIONS 2 (2008). 
443 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
444 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891). 
445 See Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13, 15-16 (1875). 
446 In the case of the International Court of Justice, for instance, the Supreme Court determined that the 
executive could not unilaterally enforce its decisions. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525-30 (2008). 
447 See id. at 530. 
448 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796). 
449 See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 
838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (D. Colo. 1983). 
450 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). Several courts have recognized consular court 
jurisdiction and appellate review as designated by statute. See, e.g., Am. China Dev. Co. v. Boyd, 148 F. 
258 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906) (No. 13,682); Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759 (9th Cir. 1907); Cunningham 
v. Rodgers, 171 F. 835 (9th Cir. 1909); Swayne & Hoyt, Inc. v. Everett, 255 F. 71 (9th Cir. 
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In 1792, for instance, the Second Congress passed a statute consistent with a treaty 
between the United States and France, giving U.S. district court judges the authority to 
hear cases related to shipwrecked French vessels off the coast of the United States.451 
U.S. consuls and vice-consuls overseas were given the right of receiving any protests 
or declarations of captains, masters, crews, passengers, and merchants (as were U.S. 
citizens) abroad, as well as any claims from foreign persons against U.S. citizens.452 
Consuls could issue decrees carrying the force of law, as would such decisions “in all 
courts in the United States.”453 They could manage the estates of U.S. persons who died 
either at sea or within their consulate.454 For their work, consuls were to be paid 
according to a set rate of compensation.455 These duties were “not be construed to the 
exclusion of others, resulting from the nature of their appointments, or any treaty or 
convention under which they may act.”456 In 1803 and 1840, Congress passed two more 
statutes, detailing further powers and responsibilities.457 
  
The system continued to develop in piecemeal fashion, with the President making 
consular appointments in an ad hoc manner. The number of consulates rapidly 
proliferated: by 1846, there were 175 consulates and commercial agencies abroad, plus 
three consuls to the Barbary States (in Tangiers, Tunis, and Tripoli).458 These officers 
tended to operate in a manner that furthered the personal interests of those in office, 
rather than those of the United States.459 In light of the sheer numbers, the annual 
expenditures, and the lack of respect afforded by other countries to the consuls’ 
positions, James Buchanan, U.S. Secretary of State, called on Congress to reform the 
system.460  
 
In 1848, Congress thus passed a fourth statute, setting out in a detailed and 
comprehensive manner, the responsibilities and judicial functions of foreign ministers 
and consuls.461 Again at the urging of the U.S. Secretary of State, just over a decade 
later, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered a new bill to carry certain 
aspects of treaties with several countries into effect.462 In 1866, Congress adopted a 
broader statute encompassing more States, which was further amended in 1870, 1874, 
 
1919); Fleming v. United States, 279 F. 613 (9th Cir. 1922); Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 
715 (9th Cir. 1926). There also may be an Article I(8)(18) claim here, consistent with Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (holding that where a treaty was constitutional, Congress had the 
power under Art. I(8)(18) to enact implementing legislation without being constrained by the 10th 
Amendment). 
451 Act of Apr. 14, 1792, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 254, 254. In Moore’s early 20th century account of consular 
law, he erroneously asserts that the first law governing consuls came in 1848. There were, however, prior 
to that time, two statutes passed that related to consular affairs. See 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 613 (1906).  
452 Sec. 2, 1 Stat. at 255. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. §§ 2, 4, 5, 1 Stat. at 255, 255-56, 256. 
456 Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 257. 
457 Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 203; Act of July 20, 1840, ch. 48, 5 Stat. 394. 
458 Report on Consular System, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 29-12 (2d Sess.), at 12 (1846). 
459 See id. at 2-3. 
460 See id. at 2-19. 
461 Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, 9 Stat. 276. 
462 See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72. 
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and 1876.463 These laws enabled U.S. consuls in China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, 
Madagascar, Turkey, Abyssinia, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat, the Samoan 
Islands, and other countries with similar treaties in place to assume judicial functions.464 
 
In 1832, for example, a treaty between the United States and the Ottoman Empire 
provided,  
 
If litigations and disputes should arise between the subjects of the Sublime Porte 
and the citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall 
judgment be pronounced unless the American Dragoman be present. Causes in 
which the sum may exceed five hundred piastres, shall be submitted to the 
Sublime Porte, to be decided according to the laws of equity and justice. 
Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and 
not being charged or convicted of any crime or offence, shall not be molested; 
and even when they have committed some offence . . . they shall be tried by 
their Minister or Consul, and punished according to their offence.”465 
 
Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty, along with custom and 
usage under the capitulatory regime in Egypt and in the former Ottoman Empire, and 
“the laws of the United States enacted to give effect to the treaties of the United States 
by virtue of which the United States was granted extraterritorial jurisdiction,” formed 
the basis for subsequent American consular courts in Egypt.466  
 
Under the relevant statutes establishing consular courts, ministers and consuls were 
provided with judicial authority,467 which extended in criminal matters to trying and 
punishing citizens accused of offenses against U.S. law,468 and for civil matters, to “all 
controversies between citizens of the United States, or others” insofar as is limited by 
the language of the governing treaty.469 Jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with 
U.S. law, or, where unsuitable or deficient, with “the common law, and the law of equity 
and admiralty.”470 With the exception of the U.S. Court of China (discussed, below), 
the judges did not enjoy tenure in office. If insufficient, ministers could make decrees 
or regulations with the force of law, with the consuls signifying their agreement or 
disagreement with the regulations in writing. Statutory law empowered the minister to 
publish the regulation, along with advice received, and to transmit the regulation to the 
Secretary of State “to be laid before Congress for revision.”471 
 
 
463 See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, § 11, 14 Stat. 310, 322 (Egypt); Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 194, § 1, 16 
Stat. 183, 183 (Madagascar); Act of Mar. 23, 1874, ch. 62, 18 Stat. 23; Act of Feb. 1, 1876, ch. 6, 19 Stat. 
2. 
464 See 47 Rev. Stat. §§ 4083, 4125-4127 (2d ed. 1878); Act of June 14, 1878, ch. 193, 20 Stat. 131. See 
also 22 U.S.C. § 141 (1952) (repealed Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773) (removing consular 
jurisdiction from Morocco, the last foreign country where consuls exercised such). 
465 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Ottoman Empire-U.S., art. IV, May 7, 1830, 8 Stat. 408, 409. 
466 See Letter from Green H. Hackworth, Legal Advisor, Sec’y of State, to Messrs. Alexander and Green 
of New York (Aug. 26, 1935), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1935, at 565 
(E.R. Perkins & Gustave A. Nuermberger eds., 1953), 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1935v01/d432. 
467 See 47 Rev. Stat. § 4083 (2d. ed. 1878); 22 U.S.C. §§ 141-183 (1952). 
468 47 Rev. Stat. § 4084. See also 22 U.S.C. § 142 (1952). 
469 47 Rev. Stat. § 4085. See also 22 U.S.C. § 143 (1952) 
470 47 Rev. Stat. § 4086. See also 22 U.S.C. § 145 (1952). 
471 47 Rev. Stat. §§ 4117-4119. 
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Like Article III courts, all consular courts have been courts of limited jurisdiction.472 
They are limited to consular business inside their district.473 Traditionally, their 
functions have included legalizing acts of foreign judicial or other functionaries; 
authenticating citizens’ marriages, births, and deaths while outside the United States; 
reclaiming deserters and providing for destitute sailors; receiving protests of masters of 
vessels; and administering the personal property of deceased citizens.474 For serious or 
complex matters carrying fines above $500 or terms of imprisonment above 60 days, 
the consul must summon up to four citizens to participate in the adjudicatory process.475 
In capital cases, the decision had to be unanimous. The judicial authority provided to 
consuls and ministers has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.476 
 
At times, Congress has acted to put consular courts on a more robust constitutional 
footing, building appeal into the Article III judicial branch. The U.S. Court for China, 
for instance, served as a District Court with extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. 
citizens in China. It arose out of the Treaty of Wangxia, a diplomatic agreement between 
the Qing dynasty and the United States in 1844, which established that U.S. citizens in 
China were exempt from the authority of local courts and subject, instead, to U.S. 
law.477 In 1860, Congress passed another statute to carry into effect a new treaty signed 
with China in 1858, as well as similar treaties made with Japan, Siam, Persia, and 
elsewhere.478 These agreements essentially formed the basis of a consular court for U.S. 
persons located in China. 
 
The court operated under U.S. law and adjudicated associated matters. But, 
following numerous complaints, in 1906 Congress created the United States Court for 
China.479 It extended jurisdiction to all criminal cases carrying a punishment in excess 
of $100 fine or 60 days’ imprisonment, and civil cases involving claims of more than 
$500.480 The court served as the appellate court for the remaining consular cases and 
could also hear appeals from the consular court in Korea.481 Appeal from the court was 
first to the Ninth Circuit (District Court and then to the Circuit Court), and thence to the 
Supreme Court.482  
 
The jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of China, both original and on appeal, in civil and 
criminal matters, was to “in all cases be exercised in conformity with said treaties and 
the laws of the United States.”483 Where deficient, “common law and the law as 
established by the decisions of the courts of the United States” applied.484 The judges 
of the court and the district of attorney were appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, with a fixed compensation set by statute.485 The tenure 
 
472 MOORE, supra note 451, at 628. 
473 See id. at 616 (citing to 47 Rev. Stat. 4088). 
474 Hajime Oura, Consular Courts 1-2 (1893) (Thesis, Cornell University School of Law), 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=historical_theses. 
475 See 47 Rev. Stat. § 4105-4107. 
476 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891); Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13, 20 (1875). 
477 See Treaty of Wangxia, China-U.S., art. XXI, July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592, 597. 
478 See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72. 
479 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814 (repealed by Treaty for Relinquishment of Extraterritorial 
Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, China-U.S., Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767). 
480 See id. §§ 1-2, 34 Stat. at 814-15. 
481 Id. § 2, 34 Stat. at 815. 
482 Id. § 3, 34 Stat. at 815. 
483 Id. § 4, 34 Stat. at 815. 
484 Id. 
485 Id. § 6, 34 Stat. at 816. 
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of office was for 10 years, with removal prior to that time by the President for cause.486 
The structure of the court reflected that of an ordinary District Court, replete with a 
Presidentially-appointed District Attorney, Marshal, and Clerk.487 The court was based 
in Shanghai and had sessions in Canton, Tientsin, and Hankau.488  
 
Along with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Norway, Brazil, Denmark, and Sweden held extraterritorial rights in 
China.489 Only the United States and Great Britain, however, had independent, 
autonomous courts.490 In every case, the threshold question for judicial proceedings was 
the citizenship of the defendant, for while any plaintiff could raise an issue, as long as 
the defendant was a national of the country in question, they had the right to proceedings 
in their own consular court.491 In 1921, the court ruled that the U.S. Constitution did not 
apply in China.492 As a practical matter, this meant no trial by jury, although, according 
to a judge on the court, “the Bill of Rights was otherwise scrupulously respected as a 
matter of primary American principle and legal policy.”493 
 
The act creating the United States Court of China was not without its critics—
including the Secretary of State Elihu Root, who roundly denounced it.494 Not least 
among the concerns was the difficulty of determining what constituted “the laws of the 
United States,” as referenced in the governing statutes.495 Congress, moreover, provided 
the tribunal with jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction had previously been 
exercised by consuls and ministers. Where consular legislation fell short, the court was 
to look to “the common law as established by the decisions of the courts of the United 
States.”496 With 45 sovereign states at the time, plus some territories, it was difficult to 
say precisely what this meant, and it mattered: most of the court’s proceedings focused 
on criminal matters, issues related to commerce, or decedents’ estates—issues largely 
addressed at a state level.497 In 1907, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to both 
the District of Columbia and to Alaska, as well as to 30 Geo. 2 c. 24 (1757)—which 
entered into common law before the United States even became a country—to reach a 
conclusion.498 According to Milton J. Helmick, who served as a judge 1934-43, the 
court subsequently “toyed for a time with the Alaska Code” before deciding to ground 
its jurisprudence in the laws adopted by the District of Columbia.499 
 
During the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, Japan invaded and 
occupied Shanghai.500 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. declared 
 
486 Id. § 7, 34 Stat. at 816. 
487 Id. § 6, 34 Stat. at 816. 
488 Id. § 1, 34 Stat. at 814. 
489 Milton J. Helmick, United States Court for China, 14 FAR E. SURV. 252, 252 (1945). 
490 Id. 
491 See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1926); Husar v. United 
States, 26 F.2d 847, 849-51 (9th Cir. 1928). 
492 See United States v. Furbush, 2 Extraterr. Cas. 73, 82-85 (U.S. Ct. China 1921) (citing and quoting In 
re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891)) (“The Constitution can have no operation in another country.”) 
493 Helmick, supra note 489, at 254. 
494 Id. at 253. 
495 See, e.g., Note, United States Court for China, 49 HARV. L. REV. 793, 794 (1936). 
496 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 4, 34 Stat. 814, 815. 
497 Note, supra note 495, at 794. 
498 See Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759, 761-63 (9th Cir. 1907). 
499 Helmick, supra note 489, at 253. 
500 See, e.g., Eds. of Encyc. Britannica, Second Sino-Japanese War: 1937-1945, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Sino-Japanese-War (Nov. 10, 2020). 
   51 
war on Japan, prompting the latter to end concessions for Americans in Shanghai and 
to imprison the judges of the court. In 1943, the United States signed a treaty with China 
that gave up any extraterritorial rights and abolished the court.501 Five years later, 
Congress formally repealed the statutory provisions.502 
 
The U.S. Court for China provides special study in consular courts, as it is the only 
one for whom appeal has been directly to an Article III court and whose judges have 
enjoyed fixed terms (as aforementioned, 10 years). In 1956, Congress repealed its final 
remaining extraterritorial privilege (in Morocco), thus ending the operation of federal 
consular courts.503  
 
B. Slavery and Land Claims 
 
In addition to the traditional consular courts, Congress has established other courts 
to implement treaty arrangements. In 1862, for example, the United States and Great 
Britain agreed to take mutual steps to suppress the slave trade.504 Once again, 
Congress’s power to legislate arose from Art. I(8)(3). The countries agreed that if either 
country discovered a ship of the other country carrying slaves on the high seas, the cargo 
would be subject to forfeiture proceeds before mixed claims courts, which would be 
established by the two countries.505 There was no appeal from these courts.506 The court 
was abolished in 1870.507 
 
Pari passu, following the Mexican-American War, the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo required that the United States would respect land ownership rights established 
by the Mexican government.508 During ratification, the Senate struck the provisions; 
however, the United States assured Mexico that the land rights would be respected.509 
Following the failure of a number of land commissions established to survey the newly-
acquired territory, in 1891 Congress created the Court of Private Land Claims.510 Five 
judges, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, held five 
year terms, with appeal from the court directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although it 
was originally designed to complete its task in five years, the Court of Private Land 
 
501 Treaty for Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, 
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503 Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773. 
504 Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade (Treaty of Washington), Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IV, 
Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225, 1227 (amended by Additional Article to the Treaty for Suppression of the 
African Slave Trade, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Feb. 17, 1863, 13 Stat. 645); Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 140, 12 Stat. 
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505 Art. IV, 12 Stat. at 1227. 
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1870, 16 Stat. 777. 
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United Mexican States (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), Mex.-U.S., arts. VIII-X, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 
929-30. See also Treaty of Mexico City, Mex.-U.S., art. V, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031, 1035. 
509 Court of Private Land Claims, 1891-1904, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/court-
private-land-claims-1891-1904 (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). 
510 Act of Mar. 8, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854 1891. See also Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative 
Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 907-08 (1930). 
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Claims continued for thirteen years, in the course of which it ruled on title to more than 
35 million acres of land.511 
VI. COURTS OF OCCUPATION: ARTICLE II(1) 
 
Like the courts addressed in Parts II-V, above, Article II courts derive from the 
Constitution. But unlike Article III(1), I(8), and IV(3) entities, or Article II(2)/I(8)(3) 
hybrids, pure Article II(1) courts of occupation do not require Congressional action prior 
to being brought into being. They are created solely at the behest of the Executive. 
Driven by duties entrusted to commissioned officers, they adhere to the Executive as an 
aspect of conquest and expansion. They are unique to (1) land purchases prior to 
Congressional establishment of territorial government, (2) armed rebellion, and (3) war 
with foreign powers.  
 
As a matter of Constitutional grounding, Article II(1), which establishes the 
President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, provides the primary locus.512 
To some extent, the authority for their creation can also be said to adhere to the 
executive by nature of the sovereignty of the United States: occupation courts may be 
integral to national integrity or to U.S. efforts to treat or to prosecute war with foreign 
powers.513 Over the course of U.S. history, at least a dozen such entities have been 
established, generally—but not solely—in the shadow of war.514 While most pre-date 
the Civil War, at least four operated in the 20th century.515 In addition to the more 
established occupation courts, numerous additional Article II(1) tribunals operated 
during the U.S. Civil War on an informal basis, with little or no record of their 
proceedings.516 Some are referred to as “provost courts,” because provost marshals, who 
handle law enforcement matters within the military, serve as judges.517 Others are 
created, and jurists appointed, at the direction of the individual responsible for 
governance of the region. Yet others are a form of military commission that do not rely 
on any, specific Congressional statute for their operation.  
 
A. Land Acquisition 
 
As an historical matter, some have been created as an interim step, prior to 
Congressional establishment of territorial government. For example, following the 
retrocession of what was to become the Louisiana territory from Spain to France, and 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s accession, President Thomas Jefferson used the impending war 
between Great Britain and France to negotiate the transfer of the French land in North 
America to the United States. As part of the Louisiana Purchase, the offices of alcaldes, 
who served as judges in criminal cases in Spanish audiencias, were abolished, leaving 
no one vested with judicial authority. Accordingly, one of Governor William 
Claiborne’s first actions in New-Orleans was to create a court of pleas, consisting of 
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seven jurists with jurisdiction over certain civil and criminal matters.518 The court could 
hear civil cases up to $3,000, with appeal for anything over $500 directly to the 
governor.519 For criminal matters, the court had jurisdiction over all offenses for which 
the punishment did not exceed 60 days’ imprisonment and a fine of $200.520 Anything 
less than $100 could be decided by an individual jurist, with appeal to the court of 
pleas.521 
 
B. Armed Rebellion 
 
Article II(I) courts also have been established in regions marked by violent civil 
unrest and armed rebellion. Examples present both early on in U.S. history as well as 
during the Civil War. While the courts established during the latter period bear many 
hallmarks of military commissions in that they are constituted by the military and try 
civilian violations of law, they can be distinguished from Article I(8)(10) and (11) 
entities as a matter of process and substance. First, unlike the case with military 
commissions, there is no explicit Congressional authorization for their creation. Instead, 
they are informally created—and disbanded—at the will of military commanders. 
Second, unlike military commissions, no declaration of war undergirds their formation. 
Third, they introduce laws and rules outside of any action by a legislature that represents 
those to whom the laws apply. Fourth, they purport to govern people within their 
locality—that is, their jurisdiction extends to both military personnel and civilians 
within a specified area. 
 
Such courts have operated from the earliest days of the Republic. Recall that during 
the Revolutionary War the colonies of East and West Florida stayed loyal to the 
Crown.522 The 1783 Treaty of Paris returned them to Spain.523 In 1810, the settlers in 
West Florida rebelled and declared independence.524 President James Madison asserted 
that the portions of West Florida from the Mississippi to the Perdido rivers had been 
acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase, and negotiations commenced with Spain.525  
 
In Spanish-controlled Florida, Seminole attacks within U.S. territories in late 1817 
and 1818 led to the creation of occupation courts. In January 1818, Major James 
Bankhead, the commanding officer in Fernandina (located on Amelia Island—and now 
the northernmost city on the coast of Florida), issued an ordinance applying U.S. law 
and installing two justices of the peace, to issue final decisions in cases involving claims 
up to one hundred dollars.526 The justices were to investigate criminal cases and to 
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forward their opinions to the commanding officer, who had final authority in cases 
affecting the life of the accused.527 To the commanding officer fell “all cases of riot, or 
other disorders that may affect the peace and security” of the island.528 As a matter of 
procedure, “[i]n all cases, particularly in matters of evidence, the usages and customs of 
the United States” applied.529 At that point, conditions of war and unrest existed in the 
territory, prompting John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, to support stringent 
measures.530 Simultaneously, General Andrew Jackson pushed for U.S. invasion and 
control of Pensacola—a goal accomplished in May 1818.531 Following conquest, in 
February 1819, Spain agreed to cede the Floridas to the United States.532 Congress did 
not ratify the Adam-Onis Treaty until 1821.533  
 
In the interim, military officers immediately assumed the duties of civil magistrates. 
The commission appointing the first governor, authorized Jackson “to exercise . . . all 
the powers and authorities heretofore exercised by the Governor and Captain General 
and Intendant of Cuba, and by the Governors of East and West Florida, within the said 
provinces, respectively.”534 Jackson, accordingly, issued an order establishing county 
courts comprised of five justices of the peace each.535 For civil cases, Spanish law 
applied (outside of witness examination), while in criminal matters common law 
applied.536 Premised on an indictment by a grand jury issued in the name of the United 
States, the criminal trials themselves were public and held before a petit jury.537 Five 
days after the first order establishing the court, the governor issued another ordinance 
detailing the court’s rules of procedure and setting compensation rates for judicial 
officers.538 The commissions for judges in West Florida were subsequently issued by 
Secretary Adams.539 
 
During the Civil War, myriad occupation courts similarly emerged as the Union 
brought different regions under control. The authority to convene such tribunals 
depended on rank—not on any particular appointment to the court.540 Many of these 
courts were so informal that essentially no records of their proceedings are left.541 They 
exercised criminal and, at times, civil jurisdiction. With no Congressional declaration 
of war, or legislative framing for the courts or the rules they executed, these tribunals 
arose solely at the behest of the executive. Applied to civilians in specified areas, they 
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tried violations of law as defined by the occupying powers—an approach consistent 
with traditional laws of war. 
 
In 1862, for instance, multiple such courts marked New Orleans and its 
surrounds.542 Immediately following capture of the city, Union forces established a 
provost marshal’s court.543 It initially focused on more traditional matters related to 
courts-martial matters: servicemembers and the laws of war. Soon, however, its 
jurisdiction extended into the civilian realm to all criminal matters and most civil 
causes.544 The military also revived former parish courts in the region.545 Many of the 
judges had left prior to occupation, requiring Union forces to install new jurists.546 Some 
civil courts, in addition, resumed operating in November 1862, with jurisdiction limited 
to defendants in the parish of Orleans.547 
 
All of these were local courts. To address the absence of any federal entities, 
President Abraham Lincoln further created the United States Provisional Court for the 
State of Louisiana. His authority to do so grew directly from the state of unrest that 
marked the region. He explained, “The insurrection which has for some time prevailed 
in several of the States of this Union, including Louisiana, [has] temporarily subverted 
and swept away the civil institutions of that State, including the judiciary and the judicial 
authorities of the Union.”548 This made it “indispensably necessary” to establish “some 
judicial tribunal . . . capable of administering justice.”549 Lincoln’s Executive Order 
establishing the court gave the judge sweeping authority 
 
to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in 
law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and 
jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts of the United States, 
conforming his proceedings so far as possible to the course of proceedings and 
practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and 
Louisiana; his judgment to be final and conclusive.550 
 
The language indicated that the court would address all matters, both state and federal. 
Lincoln went on to empower the judge “to make and establish such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction” and to empower him “to appoint 
a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk.”551 Appointment was at the pleasure of the 
President and was limited to military occupation of the city of New Orleans and the 
state.552 The court was to serve in an appellate capacity for civil cases outside of the 
parish of Orleans. Throughout this time, Louisiana courts continued to operate behind 
Confederate lines. To remedy the conflict, the judge of the Provisional Court merely 
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ordered that all cases in confederate courts be brought before his court.553 Soon 
thereafter, the military governor in the occupied region issued an order constituting a 
new state Supreme Court.554 
 
Similar courts have been created in other occupied areas, such as the Philippine 
Islands, which the military ruled from the capture of Manila in 1898 until Congress 
created a statutory framing in 1902.555 Similar experiences mark U.S. actions in Cuba 
and Puerto Rico.556 As the Supreme Court of Tennessee observed in Rutledge v. Fogg, 
a case upholding the decisions of a military occupation tribunal convened in Memphis, 
Tennessee by a Union general, the right of a country to occupy and govern the territory 
of another while in military possession of it flows from the fact of conquest and the laws 
of war.557 
 
The most recent example of the establishment of Article II courts in the midst of 
armed rebellion and violence in U.S. territory is the imposition of martial law in Hawaii 
during World War II. The Organic Act for the territory empowered the governor, “in 
case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety 
requires it,” to “suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory 
or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the 
President.”558 On December 7, 1941, Joseph Poindexter, the civilian territorial governor, 
responded to the Pearl Harbor bombings by suspending the writ of habeas corpus and 
relinquishing control of the territory to the U.S. Army commanding general, Walter C. 
Short.559 For nearly three years, the civilian government was suspended. Throughout 
that time, military courts operated.560 The Supreme Court later determined that the 
provisions in the Organic Act that allowed for imposition of military rule did not 
empower the armed forces to supplant all civilian laws when civilian government could 
continue to function.561 “Courts and their procedural safeguards,” the Court wrote, “are 
indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our founders to protect 
the liberties they valued.”562 As the system embraced “the antithesis of total military 
rule,” the Court had no choice but to reject summary criminal trials by military tribunals. 
The boundary between military and civilian power had to be carefully maintained.563 
 
C. War with Foreign Powers 
 
War with foreign powers provides a third context for the introduction of Article 
II(1) tribunals. Occupation courts in this instance must comport with the law of 
conquest, which (as a matter of international law) requires that conquering powers, to 
the extent practicable, respect local custom and laws. Accordingly, in anticipation of 
assimilating regions into the United States, the executive has consistently upheld local 
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custom in the operation of occupation courts, modifying local rules and procedures to 
the extent necessary to comport with U.S. constitutional norms.  
 
The war between the United States and Mexico, declared in May 1846, for instance, 
led to the establishment of Article II(1) occupation courts in New Mexico.564 These 
tribunals derived from the President’s commander-in-chief authorities: Colonel (and 
later Brigadier-General) Stephen W. Kearny’s orders, issued June 3, 1846, showed the 
creation of the courts as an aspect of the military command and control process.565 While 
eventually Congress might act to establish a civil territorial administration, in the 
interim, the military was to create a government replete with judicial functions.566  
 
The Kearny Code as implemented subsequently drew heavily from the Organic Law 
provided for governing the Missouri Territory—reflecting the preparation of the 
document by Colonel A.W. Doniphan, of the first regiment of Missouri mounted 
volunteers.567 The judicial structure consisted of a superior (appellate) court, constituted 
by three judges, and a number of lower (circuit) courts.568 The latter had jurisdiction 
over all criminal cases not otherwise provided by law, and “exclusive original 
jurisdiction in all civil cases that were not cognizable before the prefects and 
alcaldes.”569 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the validity of the system as it 
operated until the territorial legislature explicitly adopted the orders and laws of the 
provisional government, as well as the judicial decisions rendered by its courts.570 
 
In the missive of June 1846, the President similarly directed General Kearny to gain 
control in California.571 He was to work in concert with U.S. naval forces in the Pacific 
to conquer the territory.572 As in New Mexico, the President instructed him to establish 
civil government, leaving much to his discretion in doing so, such as “best to conciliate 
the inhabitants, and render them friendly to the United States.”573 In reflection of 
Kearny’s new responsibilities, W.L. Marcy, Secretary of War, conveyed a promotion in 
rank upon him, to that of brevet brigadier general, as soon as he set forth for 
California.574 
 
In 1847, Commodore James Biddle, the naval commander in Monterey, created a 
court to rule on prize vessels captured on the high sea.575 With the agreement of the 
military governor of California, and (later) explicit Presidential authorization, Biddle 
named a navy chaplain as judge.576 For matters on land, special tribunals were similarly 
constituted, such as a court formed in 1847 in Sonoma to address criminal charges 
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regarding the murder and kidnaping of Native Americans.577 The following year, a 
similar court convened at Monterey.578 Absent a court of appeal, the governor 
occasionally heard appellants. How they were treated, though, varied by the governor 
in question: Governor Richard Mason, who served as the fifth military governor of 
California, generally refused to hear an appeal if the case had already come before a 
jury, whereas General Bennett Riley, who commanded the Military Department in 
Upper California and acted as Provincial Governor 1849-50, in at least some cases 
ordered a stay in execution until a higher court could be convened.579 
 
The creation of these courts was considered an integral part of the prosecution of 
war.580 During President James K. Polk’s annual message to Congress recognized the 
United States’ “undisputed occupation” of New Mexico and the Californias, “all 
resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased within their limits.”581 He argued for 
their assimilation into the United States and called on Congress to establish territorial 
governments as quickly as practicable over them.582 In the interim, the land was to be 
“governed by our military and naval commanders under the general authority which is 
conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war.”583 During the subsequent debates in 
Congress, members recognized the President’s plenary power to govern conquered 
territory, subject only to international law: the Constitution did not apply to land outside 
the United States.584 
 
Article II(1) occupation courts do not just mark North American territory formerly 
held by France, Spain, or Mexico. In the aftermath of World War II, for instance, three 
courts were created to conduct matters in Germany and Japan. Under Law No. 2, the 
United States suspended the German courts in the zone that it occupied, replacing them 
with Military Government Courts.585 The Military Government asserted the authority to 
dismiss or suspend any German judge or court official, to disbar any notary or lawyer, 
to supervise and observe all judicial proceedings, to access all court documents and 
records, to review all decisions of trial and appellate courts, and to nullify, suspend, or 
modify any determination rendered by the courts.586 The occupation courts were 
constituted by summary courts (for penalties of up to 1 year’s imprisonment and fines 
up to $1,000), intermediate courts (for penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and 
fines not exceeding $10,000), and general courts (for penalties of any lawful sentence, 
including capital cases).587 Their jurisdiction extended to all offenses committed by non-
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military personnel in the occupied area, trying matters linked to both German law and 
legislation passed by the military government.588  
 
The Rules of Practice for Military Government Courts reflected Anglo-American, 
German, and courts-martial practices. All persons arrested were to be brought as soon 
as practicable before a tribunal and apprised of the charges.589 During trial, defendants 
could cross-examine witnesses and present their case.590 Certain fundamental rights, 
mirroring those laid out in the U.S. constitution, would be afforded to defendants.591 
The courts had exclusive criminal jurisdiction.592  
 
The U.S. also created a Military Government Court for Civil Actions, consisting of 
three members of the bar in good standing in one of the states or territories or the District 
of Columbia of the United States.593 In 1949, the United States Courts of the Allied High 
commission, operated by the U.S. State Department, replaced the Military Government 
tribunals with civilian jurists.594 In addition to criminal matters, the court addressed all 
cases in which servicemembers or their dependents, or civilian officials, were a party.595 
These tribunals ended with the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany).596 However, the United States maintained an occupation 
regime within West Berlin.597 Thus, the United States Court for Berlin was established 
in 1955.598 By the time it was abolished in 1990, however, it had only heard one case.599 
 
The Treaty of Peace with Japan authorized the United States to exercise jurisdiction 
over certain Japanese territories.600 In 1957, President Eisenhower issued an Executive 
Order providing for a judicial system in the Ryukyu Islands modeled after that employed 
in Puerto Rico.601 It provided for a local court with general jurisdiction over civil matters 
and criminal jurisdiction related to Ryukyuans, as well as a second, Civil Administration 
Court system, with trial and appellate tribunals.602 These entities had authority over any 
case or controversy impacting U.S. property or interests, as well as cases to which U.S. 
persons were party.603 The U.S. relinquished control of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972.604 
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VII. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
 
Administrative agencies house several adjudicatory bodies that are not considered part 
of the federal judicial system. They are distinguished by the degree of independence 
that they have from even the Executive. Their existence derives in significant measure 
from the Progressive Era and the rapid proliferation of the administrative state.605 It 
would be impossible to summarize all such entities: as of March 2017, more than 1,900 
administrative law judges (ALJs) were serving in at least 27 adjudicatory bodies, with 
their specific roles and responsibilities reflecting those of the agencies and departments 
in which they were located.606  
 
The largest of these entities, which rivals the size of the Bankrupcy Courts, is the 
Social Security Administration (SSA), which houses nearly 85 percent of all ALJs.607 
The SSA annually processes over 650,000 decisions at the hearing level.608 Like the 
SSA, most administrative agency tribunals hold hearings, issue decisions or make 
recommendations, and enforce agency regulations.609 Many of these decisions are 
reviewable within an appellate structure within the agency, such as the SSA’s Appeals 
Council. Often, the reviewing body consists of administrative appeals judges (AAJs).610 
 
Similarly, by statute, the U.S. Tax court “is not an agency of, and shall be 
independent of, the executive branch.”611 The line between the quasi-judicial functions 
often undertaken by administrative agencies and the judicial matters that come before 
Article I or Article III courts, though, is not always clear. In 1932, for example, the 
Court allowed a private right (workers’ compensation) to be heard by an agency, while 
still trying to preserve Article III courts’ role in determining questions of law, as well 
as certain matters of fact.612 This case played a central role in the growth of the 
administrative agencies.613  
 
Entities discussed in Part III, above (i.e., specialized Article I(8) courts), are (a) 
statutorily named a court of record; (b) explicitly established under Article I by statute; 
or (c) stated by the Supreme Court or by the reviewing appellate court as being an 
Article I court. In contrast, administrative tribunals do not fit any of these categories.614 
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body that sees more cases per year are the Bankruptcy Courts. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, 
U.S. CTS.,  https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-
2019#:~:text=Civil%20Filings,rose%202%20percent%20to%20150%2C936 (last visited Jan. 8, 2021) 
(795,926 terminated cases). 
609 Executive Agency Courts, supra note 605. 
610 5 U.S.C.A. § 5372b (West). 
611 26 U.S.C.A. § 7441. 
612 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 27, 49-51, 63-65 (1932). See also Pfander, supra note 7, at 658-59. 
613 Id. at 659 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 367-377 (5th ed. 2003); Fallon, Jr., supra note 7, at 946-48, 986-91). 
614 The U.S. Immigration Courts, for instance, are firmly entrenched inside the Department of Justice and 
not independent. There are no cases from the Supreme Court or Courts of Appeals stating that they are 
Article I courts; nor does the legislation creating them indicate such. In addition, there are several law 
review articles indicating they are not Article I courts. See, e.g., Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the 
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Some are themselves recognized as independent agencies within a department, with the 
power to rule on decisions issued by other agencies.  
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, for instance, created in 
1970, rules on cases forwarded by the Department of Labor which relate to disputes 
over the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s safety and health 
inspections.615 The Executive Office for Immigration Review at the U.S. Department of 
Justice administers the immigration court system. Once the Department of Homeland 
Security charges an alien with violating immigration laws, EOIR determines whether 
the person is removable and/or whether they qualify for relief.616 EOIR’s Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge has some 350 immigration judges who hold removal hearings 
as well as other administrative proceedings in 60 immigration courts across the 
country.617 The appellate entity, the Board of Immigration Appeals, hears appeals from 
certain DHS determinations and immigration judge decisions, most of which involve 
orders of removal or applications for relief. Certain orders are designated as 
precedential, governing similarly-situated cases going forward.618 The EOIR also 
includes an Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which oversees cases 
involving sanctions on employers for hiring unauthorized workers.619 The 
Administrative Procedure Act sets the rules that govern administrative agencies, with 
subsequent review of their decisions in Article III courts.620 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
For decades, scholars have wrestled with how Article I courts, in the absence of life 
tenure during good behavior, undiminished compensation, and appointment with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, could as a constitutional matter hear categories of 
cases and controversies reserved to Article III. A handful have endorsed the theory of 
appellate review: as long as cases can be adequately examined by an Article III court, 
Congress has some leeway in the tribunals it erects.621 Others considered the operation 
of Article I entities to be merely necessary.622  
 
In 2004, Professor James Pfander offered instead a distinction rooted in the 
constitutional text: between the inferior courts referenced in Article III and the inferior 
tribunals of Article I, distinguishing them by, in the case of the former, the exercise of 
the judicial power of the United States. He noted, as a condition for the latter, their 
subservience to Article III. Pfander’s account is both persuasive and helpful; however, 
it leaves open the question of how to think about courts that are neither Article I entities 
nor subservient to the Supreme Court, such as territorial, consular, or occupation courts.  
 
 
Immigration Courts of the United States: Why Is There No Will to Make It an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY 
L. REV. 17 (2013). 
615 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as 
amended at  29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678). 
616 EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FACT SHEET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: AN 
AGENCY GUIDE 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download. 
617 Id. 
618 Id. 
619 Id. 
620 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5 U.S.C.A.). 
621 See, e.g., Fallon, Jr., supra note 7, at 943-949; and Redish, Legislative Courts, supra note 7, at 226-28. 
622 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 7, at 265. 
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In his narrow emphasis on the Article III/I divide, Pfander did not consider the 
possibility that either Article IV or Article II might provide an alternative constitutional 
locus. Of these, territorial courts have come in for their fair share of criticism.623 Perhaps 
most recently, Professor William Baud has attempted to bridge the divide by suggesting 
a distinction among courts based on the specific power being exercised: i.e., when 
courts exercise an executive power, they are an Article I entity, whereas when they 
exercise a judicial power, they must be understood as the judicial power of the sovereign 
in question.624 Thus, states, tribal entities, and the federal government, as well as 
territories, constitute separate governments, for which a judicial power can be exercised 
in parallel with each other.  
 
In some ways, Baud’s approach gets us further than Pfander, in that it accounts for 
territorial entities. But it still does not address the existence of other federal tribunals, 
such as consular courts, slave courts, extraterritorial entities, or courts of occupation. 
When all federal courts are taken into account, a very different picture emerges—one 
rooted in the Constitutional text. 
 
As this Article has demonstrated, the federal judicial system, is comprised of general 
and specialized Article III(1) courts that carry the judicial power of the United States 
and, as such, constitute the third branch. It also includes specialized courts introduced 
by Congress consistent with Article I(8)(9) and other enumerated powers, and 
territorial courts derived from Article IV(3). In addition, it is constituted by treaty-
based extraterritorial courts rooted in both Article II(2) and Article I(8)(3) and courts 
of occupation introduced by the President consistent with the Article II(2) 
Commander-in-Chief authority. All of these tribunals have a constitutional nexus. 
Many—but not all—of them are established by Congress. Many—but not all—of 
them are inferior to the Supreme Court. Some—but not all of them—exercise the 
judicial power of the United States. All of them adjudicate matters of law in ways that 
impact the rights of U.S. citizens. It is time to jettison the prior models and adopt, 
instead, a more robust understanding of the federal judicial system, grounded the 
Constitutional text. 
 
623 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 7, at 719 (calling the Supreme Court’s acceptance of territorial courts as 
“the first step down the road to perdition”); Lawson, supra note 7, at 893 (referring to Marshall’s 
decision in Cantor as “fatuous”). 
624 See Baude, supra note 6. 
